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ABSTRACT
As a result of failing financial markets, rampant managerial abuse of shareholder
return through grossly unfair compensation packages and shareholder outrage at
corporate governance apathy, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act in July of 2010. Two major provisions contained within the
Dodd-Frank legislation are say-on-pay and clawbacks of bonus compensation. This
research utilizes a trust game and experimental economics methodologies to test the
relative influence of say on pay and clawbacks of bonus compensation on shareholder
trust and manager trustworthiness. Results indicate that shareholders are more likely to
participate in the investment process if they feel they have a voice in that process AND if
they are comfortable that managers can be trusted to act responsibly. Likewise, managers
are more trustworthy (i.e. return something to shareholders) a higher percentage of the
time when the clawback is in place. Also, manager offers are likely to be lower when
there is a penalty for misreporting. These findings suggest that the policy requiring a
penalty for financial restatements is a strong incentive for managers to be conservative in
their reporting of financial data. Finally, managers did not make OFFERS which were
significantly different from what they thought was fair. However, ACTUAL RETURN
was, in general, statistically lower than what either managers or shareholders considered
to be a fair return. Differences between actual return and shareholder perception of
fairness were particularly striking in the “no-penalty” conditions such that the difference
between actual and fair return was statistically significant regardless of treatment
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condition. However, the evidence does suggest that the clawback mitigates this inequity
to some extent.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
“The best check against unchecked CEO’s is an empowered shareholder group.”
Senator Charles E. Schumer, The Washington Post
The collapse of U.S. financial markets in 2008 caused many to question the conventional
wisdom of manager/shareholder alignment through bonus compensation. Historically, it is not
uncommon for managers to receive bonuses for exemplary earnings performance as a means of
bridging the gap between divergent manager and shareholder interests. However, in the midst of
the greatest stock market crash since 1929, when the U.S. stock market was down 11.2 trillion
dollars (Paradis, 2009) and many Americans had lost not only their jobs but half of their
retirement funds as well, corporate executives continued to enjoy not only excessive salaries but
exorbitant bonuses as well. In the aftermath of this economic crisis, many concluded that
executive pay arrangements might have encouraged excessive risk-taking by managers out to
maximize their own personal wealth at the expense of shareholder returns. Fixing such pay
arrangements would be important in preventing similar excesses in the future (Dillon, 2009).
This belief has led firms and public officials to seek compensation reforms that would eliminate
excessive incentives to take risks (Bebchuk et al., 2010).
On July 21, 2010, Congress signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the Dodd-Frank Act). This 2,300 page
document is designed to increase shareholder involvement in the corporate governance process,
curb governance abuses by institutional investors and provide much more stringent oversight
with regard to compensation strategies for financial institutions. Congress describes the Act as
being “To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
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transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes”.
Two policies, issued as a direct result of compensation reform within the Dodd-Frank
Act, say-on-pay and clawbacks of executive compensation, were put in place to help strengthen
shareholder confidence in the investment process while holding corporate executives and their
respective boards accountable to shareholders. Say-on-pay is a practice whereby shareholders
are allowed a non-binding (advisory) vote in deciding the compensation structure for corporate
executives. Clawbacks are safeguards to allow performance based bonuses that have been paid
to corporate executives to be rescinded in the event that financial statements, upon which those
bonuses are based, are restated within a certain number of years. These two policies, say-on-pay
and clawbacks, and the way in which they affect the investment cycle are the general focus of
this study.
Under the Dodd-Frank legislation, shareholders must be allowed a non-binding vote to
approve executive compensation not less frequently than once every three years. Research has
shown that shareholders do consider excessive executive compensation when casting their votes
either for or against executive compensation strategies (Alissa 2009) and that allowing
shareholders a voice in the governance process, whether mandatory or voluntary, increases
shareholder trust which leads to greater investment (Bowlin et al., 2010).
Dodd-Frank also imposes a requirement that all public firms must implement a clawback
policy which applies to any executive officer (rather than just the CEO or CFO) if that firm is to
be listed on any public exchange. In addition, the clawback policy must require bonuses based
on reported accounting numbers to be recalled if financial statements are restated because of a
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material noncompliance.

Intentional misconduct is no longer a requirement to trigger the

clawback of incentive based compensation and the action to enforce this policy need not be
initiated by the SEC. Under the new legislation, incentive based compensation is subject to
clawback for a three-year period from the date of restatement rather than the shorter twelvemonth period previously allowed.
The policy provisions previously described, “say-on-pay” and “clawbacks” have been put
in place to increase shareholder trust in the corporate governance process and elicit more
responsible behavior on the part of corporate executives. Although prior research suggests that
say-on-pay does increase shareholder activism (Alissa 2009; Conyon and Sadler 2010) as well as
shareholder trust (Bowlin et al. 2010), no study has investigated whether say-on-pay combined
with a clawback policy will increase shareholder trust or change manager behavior with respect
to financial reporting. The limited research on clawbacks, apart from a say-on-pay provision,
suggests that managers do not change the riskiness of their reporting behavior after adoption of a
clawback policy (Hodge and Winn 2011). If managers do in fact inflate accounting numbers to
ensure higher bonus compensation, this result is counter-intuitive and contrary to what Congress
intended when it implemented the mandatory clawback policy requirement. The behavioral
constructs of trust and reciprocity have been studied extensively in the economics literature. In a
typical trust game, players are randomly paired and given a sum of money. The first player can
either “invest” her sum of money with the hope of receiving a greater return or keep the money
that she is given. The “investment” is made successful by the researcher who triples the amount
before passing it on to the second player. The second player can then keep all of the money he
receives or return some of it to the first player. According to rational economic wisdom, the first
player will keep her original endowment because she anticipates that the second mover will not
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return any money to her. Despite this bleak prediction of non-cooperative behavior, positive
investment does often occur. Behavioral researchers have examined various aspects of trust and
reciprocity such as monitoring, sanctions, trembling, crowding-out, and pre-commitment, but the
overriding conclusions are: 1) despite the vulnerable position that investment requires, people
will give up a certain amount of money with the hope of receiving a greater return (Berg et al.
1995; Bohnet and Frey 1997; Charness and Rabin 2005; Dickhaut et al. 2008; Deck 2009); and
2) despite the assumption of self-interested, non-cooperative behavior, responders tend to exhibit
reciprocity by returning a positive amount to senders (McCabe et al. 2003; Cox and Deck 2006;
Berg et al. 1995).
Trust game research on stated preferences is of particular interest in the current study
wherein we operationalize say-on-pay by allowing investors to communicate with managers
regarding a desired return. This technique has been found to be quite effective at influencing the
return behavior of trustee/managers (Charness and Rabin 2005). Also of particular interest is the
game theory literature on punishment. For example, Houser et al. (2008) find that regardless of
whether punishment is imposed intentionally by another player or imposed by chance, trustees
return more when the threat of punishment exists and hostile actions are punished with much
more consistency than friendly actions are rewarded (Abbink et al. 2000).
Although prior research on trust and reciprocity is extensive, no study to date has used a
game theoretical approach to investigate the specific policy implications contained within the
Dodd-Frank Act. With respect to corporate reporting, the financial statements can be construed
as an offer to shareholders to invest based on the assertions of management. Likewise, the
expression of an opinion by shareholders regarding a desired return can be construed as a
counter-offer. In publicly traded companies, managers who receive bonus compensation as a
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result of misrepresented financial statements, whether intentional or not, face the threat of
clawed back bonuses. Because say on pay and clawbacks of executive compensation are now
mandatory policy requirements within the Dodd-Frank Act, it is important to investigate how
such requirements impact the unique relationships between shareholders and managers.
Specifically, this study will examine whether these legislatively imposed shareholder protections
will positively impact shareholder trust and/or manager reciprocity. Experiment participants will
begin the game with an endowment of real money and will assume the role of either shareholder
or manager in an investment-type situation. If shareholders choose to invest, this action will be
interpreted as trust.

If managers choose to return a positive amount, this action will be

interpreted as positive reciprocity (i.e. trustworthy behavior). Because a return is not certain,
trust is required for investment in every condition. However, participants will play under various
game conditions which represent the specific policy provisions of the previously discussed
legislation. For example, half of the shareholder participants will be allowed to express an
opinion regarding desired return (i.e. say-on-pay) and half of the manager participants will be
subject to a penalty if they “mislead” investors. Game design will be described in greater detail
in the Chapter 3.

Motivation and Contribution
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of legally mandated shareholder
protections on both shareholder and manager behavior. The Dodd-Frank Act was issued in July
of 2010 in response to failing financial markets, rampant managerial abuse of shareholder return
through grossly unfair compensation packages and shareholder outrage at corporate governance
apathy. We investigate the impact of both say on pay and clawbacks of executive compensation

5

using experimental economics methods to determine the effect of each on shareholder
investment as well as manager return. To date, empirical studies regarding the impact of DoddFrank have focused primarily on either the say on pay feature of the legislation or the clawback
provision. Using archival data gathered from UK companies, researchers have focused on
whether or not boards mitigate the agency problem which arises from separation of ownership
and control within the corporate structure (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Conyon and Peck, 1998;
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Main et al., 1995). In other words, do boards effectively minimize
the costs that owners must incur to acquire information about the activities of management and
to curtail management opportunism. Gilson and Kraakman (1991, p. 873) assert that in the
corporate governance debate, all arguments ultimately converge on the role of the board of
directors in general, and, more specifically, on the role of outside directors (Main et al., 1995).
As these authors point out, studies in the area of corporate governance have tended to focus on
board independence and CEO power, particularly with regard to protecting shareholder interests
in a variety of settings, including the structure of executive compensation.
Although prior corporate governance research has focused on the role of corporate
directors as a mediary between shareholders and managers, particularly with respect to executive
compensation, we argue that because of the tremendous influence of management, corporate
boards are no longer objective representatives of shareholder interests. With respect to CEO
power, Main et al. (1995) note that in order for economic theory to apply usefully to the
governance of the corporation, board members must be truly independent of the CEO. While in
principle, board members are charged with selecting, monitoring, rewarding, and, if necessary,
replacing the CEO, the reality is far more ambiguous. For reasons discussed previously, the
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CEO of a company wields tremendous power over the board of directors of that company
regarding the extent of protection which is provided for shareholders (Lorsch, p. 13).

Managerial Power
Managerial power theory, also known as rent extraction theory, predicts that managers
can use their power and influence over boards or compensation consultants for a given firm to
extract excess pay. Although compensation consultants are often utilized by boards to provide a
more independent assessment of appropriate executive compensation, in the final analysis,
compensation contracts are often far from objective. Consistent with managerial power theory,
the compensation consultant may be hired by the CEO; thus, he may feel obliged to promote the
CEO’s interests above shareholders’ (Conyon et al., 2009). Additionally, consultants may be
reluctant to recommend pay contracts the CEO may not like for fear of being fired or not rehired
by the client organization (Conyon et al., 2009).
Managerial power theory plays an important part in the management-board relationship
as well, often preventing outside directors from acting efficiently to represent the best interest of
shareholders.

Lorsch (1989) explored how board members deal with both internally and

externally caused crises, and those that occur suddenly and dramatically, as well as those that
emerge more gradually. Lorsch (1989) found that when boards had to act without CEO support,
or in opposition to the CEO, lack of power inhibited them, delaying their ability to act (Lorsch,
1989). Corporate directors must exhibit expertise in cultivating effective working relationships
with the CEO’s whom they rely on for information and data. Additionally, boards must deflect,
or at least mitigate, managerial power to function effectively as fiduciary representatives with the
ability to maintain shareholder trust.

7

Several studies have linked board performance with the ability to effectively negotiate
and monitor executive compensation. Bebchuk and Fried (2005) show that managerial influence
over the design of pay arrangements has produced considerable distortions in these
arrangements, resulting in costs to investors and the economy.

This influence has led to

compensation schemes that weaken managers’ incentives to increase firm value and even create
incentives to take actions that reduce long-term value, as was the case with both Bear Stearns
and Lehman (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Bebchuk, et al., 2010). The underlying principle is that
a company’s CEO should play no part in the determination of his or her own pay (Conyon et al.,
2009).

Williamson (1985, p. 324) asserts that the board of directors should be regarded

principally as a governance instrument of shareholders and that management participation should
not become so extensive as to upset that basic board purpose. Where it does, managerial
discretion is apt, sooner or later, to manifest itself in self-dealing and subgoal pursuit
(Williamson, 1985, p. 317) as is evident by the growing abuses in the area of executive
compensation.

Trust Issue
The dramatic rise in CEO pay during the last two decades has been the subject of much
public criticism, which intensified following the corporate governance scandals that began
erupting in late 2001 (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). The wave of corporate scandals shook
confidence in the performance of public company boards and drew attention to possible flaws in
their executive compensation practices (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). As a result, there is now
widespread recognition that many boards have employed compensation arrangements that do not
serve shareholders’ interests (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005).
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In response to these weaknesses in the corporate governance process, Congress enacted
the Dodd-Frank Act with the hope that shareholders will become more involved in the setting of
executive compensation and boards will be much more transparent in their dealings with upper
management. Two policies mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act that are the central focus of this
study are “say-on-pay” and “clawbacks” of executive bonuses due to financial restatement.
These policies have a direct bearing on the issues of shareholder trust and corporate
accountability.

The Dodd-Frank reforms have been implemented in an attempt to restore

confidence in the governance process and to protect shareholders from managerial opportunism.
The current research is needed to help inform policy makers about whether these reforms will
provide enough incentive for shareholders to become more active in the governance process and
for managers to faithfully exercise their responsibility to maximize shareholder wealth.
Accounting scholars have long been challenged to demonstrate the relevance and
timeliness of their research to the issues faced by accounting policymakers (Kachelmeier &
King, 2002). As the SEC and Congress continue to address the issue of self-serving managers
and shareholder apathy, this study attempts to provide meaningful, timely feedback through the
use of an experimental economics model based on the impact of legally mandated say-on-pay
and clawback provisions on both shareholder and manager behavior. Recent Congressional
legislation (the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010) and SEC standards (the Proxy Disclosure
Enhancements) have the potential to improve market efficiency by involving shareholders in the
governance process and by holding managers to a higher standard of accountability to those who
provide crucial market capital.

In this study, we use experimental economics methods to

investigate whether shareholders demonstrate greater trust in managers when given a voice in the
governance process and whether they invest more often when managerial performance is a
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factor. We further investigate whether corporate managers act in a more trustworthy manner as a
result of shareholder input and increased pay-for-performance requirements.
As agency theory posits, and as history has borne out, in the absence of adequate control
mechanisms, managers will engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of shareholders’
long-term financial welfare. We have seen evidence of such behavior in our financial markets
with the implosion of financial giants such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.

Risky

decision making for short-term benefits by self-interested managers has exploited shareholders
and damaged public trust.

However, complete contracting and total alignment of

shareholder/manager interests as prescribed in agency theory literature is unlikely to occur since
it is impossible to anticipate all future circumstances.
Legislatively imposed controls, such as say-on-pay and clawbacks of executive
compensation, as outlined in the Dodd-Frank Act, provide external incentives for both
shareholders and managers to engage in more meaningful economic exchanges. Prior research
supports the finding that shareholders do tend to be more involved in the governance process
(Alissa, 2009) and exhibit greater levels of both trust and investment (Bowlin et al. 2010) when
they are given an opportunity to express their opinion, especially with regard to executive
compensation.

Prior research also finds that controls (such as the clawback of executive

compensation) induce cooperation (Bracht and Feltovich 2008) which in turn positively affects
trust; despite the claims in previous research that the mere presence of a control system causes
decision makers to view the collaborative setting as non-cooperative, and other collaborators as
untrustworthy (Coletti, et al. 2005).
Clawbacks of executive compensation, as mandated by Congress, are borne directly by
corporate executives. It is the intent of Congress that when faced with the potentially negative
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regulatory backlash of non-compliance with Dodd-Frank, managers will act in the best interest of
the shareholders they represent. Based on a hypothetical managerial decision, Coletti et al.
(2005) found that collaborators who were subject to higher levels of control were deemed more
trustworthy by observers. Likewise, CEO/managers who are subject to greater shareholder
accountability should be deemed more trustworthy by shareholders.
The Dodd-Frank Act permits shareholders to choose how often they will vote on
executive compensation. Specifically, they may choose to vote every one, two or three years
depending on the preference of the majority. This research is the first to consider the frequency
with which shareholders choose to exercise their right to vote on executive compensation. The
current study is also the first to incorporate both say on pay and clawbacks of executive
compensation in an effort to understand the individual and collective impact of these control
mechanisms on shareholder and manager behavior.

Experimental Economics
In the current study of legislatively mandated executive compensation policy reforms, we
use experimental economics methods to investigate whether shareholder trust is improved or
manager behavior is altered in the presence of either shareholder say-on-pay, clawback of bonus
compensation, or both.

By giving shareholders a non-binding vote on the executive

compensation structure of the firms for whom they provide capital, managers are made aware of
shareholder expectations. Additionally, by implementing mandatory clawback provisions of
executive bonuses in the event of financial restatements, shareholders have greater assurance of
performance related rewards.

Unlike other studies that investigate the use of similar

control mechanisms (Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Alissa, 2009; Ferri and Maber, 2010), we use an
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experimental, rather than an archival design. We do this for two reasons: (1) our experimental
investigation has the potential to inform policy makers of the impact of very recent legislation
with respect to shareholder activism and resultant manager behavior; and (2) using an
experimental economics model allows us to more effectively explore the trust relationship
between shareholders and managers thereby isolating factors which improve and strengthen the
trust relationship between market participants.
This study is the first of its kind to provide evidence regarding both shareholder trust and
manager trustworthiness by introducing shareholder expectation and pay for performance within
the experimental design of an investment game 1. According to economic theory, rational players
in an investment game should exhibit purely self-interested behavior. However, prior trust
research does not support this theory. In fact, researchers have found high levels of investment
and amounts returned, indicating trust on the part of the first mover and trustworthiness (i.e.
reciprocity) on the part of the second mover (Berg et al., 1995; McCabe et al., 2003; Dickhaut et
al., 2008).

The current research will extend the prior literature by incorporating both

shareholder expectation and pay for performance in our experimental design.
According to the popular press, corporate boards have failed to effectively set and
monitor executive compensation. From 1995 to 2005, the average worker’s pay, adjusted for
inflation, increased only 4.3%, while CEO compensation increased by 298% (Popken, 2007). In
that same period, the ratio of median CEO compensation to that of the average worker increased
from approximately 60 to 1 to 155 to 1 (Locke, 2008). As Locke (2008) points out, the heart of
1

In an investment game, players are randomly paired and assigned the role of first or second mover. Each player is
initially given a show-up fee which will be used in playing the game. The first mover must decide whether to
“invest” any portion or all of her show-up fee in hopes of receiving a larger return. The investment is typically
tripled by the researcher and then given to the second mover who must decide how much of the investment , if any,
he will return to the first mover. If the first mover invests, she is said to have “trusted”. If the second mover returns
a reasonable amount, he is said to have been “trustworthy”. See Berg et al., (1995) for an example of this type of
experimental design.
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the controversy on executive compensation is really a perception of fairness rather than an
attitude toward the absolute level of CEO compensation. What has led to increased regulation on
executive compensation, as well as the erosion of public trust, is “a disproportionate distribution
of wealth that leaves the ‘average Joe’ significantly less well off in comparison” (Locke, 2008).
With passage of the 2010 legislative and regulatory provisions aimed at increasing
management transparency and motivating shareholders to become involved in the governance
process, we can inform policy makers of the potential benefits of these newly enacted rules by
testing, in a controlled experimental environment, the reaction of managers to shareholders who
have a role in the governance process. Additionally, we can examine manager behavior in a
situation where potential abuses in compensation strategies have negative consequences in the
form of “clawed back” monetary awards.
Finally, this research provides an opportunity to address the challenge raised by O’Reilly
and Main (2010) to develop a more comprehensive model of executive compensation that
incorporates both economic and psychological determinants. O’Reilly and Main (2010) argue
that agency theory alone does not fully explain the complexity of the compensation negotiation
process that transpires between managers/CEO’s and corporate boards. Rather, there are a
number of theories, in addition to agency theory, such as management power and reciprocity2
that collectively explain the relationship between CEO’s, corporate boards, and shareholders.
Accordingly, the current research seeks to examine the trust relationship between
managers and shareholders using an experimental economics model. Unlike prior research in
this area, we incorporate shareholder expectation as well as pay for performance measures within
our design to test the policy implications of the Dodd-Frank legislation. In light of recent

2

Reciprocity is the term commonly used in studies on trust to describe the responsive action of a person in whom
trust has been placed.
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economic events, this research is needed to inform policy makers of the potential impact of the
new mandatory guidelines on both shareholder trust and manager trustworthiness.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review
of the related literature, Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the experimental design,
Chapter 4 develops our hypotheses, Chapter 5 describes our analysis and results, and Chapter 6
concludes with a discussion of the implications and limitations of the study.
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW
The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, otherwise known as the DoddFrank Act, was passed in July of 2010. Without question, the most sweeping piece of corporate
governance legislation since Sarbanes-Oxley, the Dodd-Frank Act attempts, among other things,
to curb executorial abuses in the area of bonus compensation through greater shareholder
activism and increased governmental controls. This act will require extensive standard setting by
a number of federal financial and securities regulatory agencies including the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Reserve
System, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as well as establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council. It has
been estimated that the Act requires some 243 3 new regulations, of which nearly 40% must be
put in place by the SEC. Although the Dodd-Frank Act is aimed primarily at financial reform,
there are a number of provisions that relate to corporate governance for all public companies,
including but not limited to the following:
1. Within 1 year following the date of enactment, the SEC must issue rules requiring all
members of a listed company’s compensation committee to be independent4.
2. Within 1 year following the date of enactment, the SEC must issue rules requiring
any compensation committee advisor to be independent.

3

Estimate taken from Davis Polk and Wardwell summary of Dodd-Frank Act
Final SEC regulations regarding the say on pay requirement and the disclosure requirements described here were
implemented in January of 2011.
4
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3. Compensation committees must be ultimately responsible for the appointment,
compensation, and oversight of the work of any compensation consultant and must
disclose the use of such consultant to the shareholders.
4. The SEC must issue rules requiring companies to disclose the relationship between a
company’s executive compensation actually paid and its financial performance.
5. The SEC must issue rules requiring companies to disclose: (a) the median annual total
compensation of all employees, except the CEO; (b) the annual total compensation of
the CEO; and (c) the ratio of the median employee annual compensation to that of the
CEO.
6. Within 6 months after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, companies must provide
their shareholders with a non-binding vote to approve executive compensation at any
annual or other meeting of shareholders no less frequently than once every 3 years.
7. The SEC must enforce implementation of policies relating to (a) disclosure of
incentive-based compensation that is based on publicly reported financial information
and (b) clawback policies enabling the recovery of incentive-based compensation
from current or former executive officers following a restatement5. The amount to be
clawed back is the amount in excess of what would have been paid under the restated
results (Davis-Polk document).
One explanation for the recent breakdown in corporate governance is explained, in large
part, by agency theory which posits that due to the separation of ownership from control,
inherent within the corporate form of organization, there are bound to be conflicting interests
between managers and owners. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the relationships within the
corporate form as a nexus of contracts in which the rights and responsibilities of all employees,
5

The SEC is expected to issue final regulations regarding the clawback policy requirement sometime in 2012.
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owners, customers and suppliers are stipulated in writing. Since it is impossible to anticipate
every possible situation, we must ultimately concede that complete contracting is highly
unlikely, if not impossible.

Agency Theory
Agency theory posits that where a division of labor exists such that a principal must rely
on the efforts of an agent to perform some service or product, there is a risk that the agent will
engage in opportunistic behavior which is not in the best interest of the principal. Agency theory
is most relevant in situations where contracting problems are difficult. These include situations
in which there is (a) substantial goal conflict between principals and agents such that agent
opportunism is likely (e.g. owners and managers, managers and professionals, suppliers and
buyers); (b) sufficient outcome uncertainty to trigger the risk implications of the theory (e.g. new
product innovation, young and small firms, recently deregulated industries); and (c)
unprogrammed or team-oriented jobs in which evaluation of behaviors is difficult (Eisenhardt,
1989).
Adam Smith alluded to the agency problem, created by division of labor, in his 1776
publication of The Wealth of Nations.
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private
copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they
are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it.
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Negligence and

profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the
affairs of such a company.
Smith’s idea was not formally introduced as a theory until the mid 1970’s (Mitnick, 1973; Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). The “model of man” underlying agency and organizational economics is
that of the self-interested actor rationally maximizing his own personal economic gain
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Given that humans are assumed to be self-interested creatures, the
principal-agent problem is one of potentially opportunistic behavior on the part of agents in the
absence of adequate monitoring or incentive alignment mechanisms to protect the interests of
shareholders.
Eisenhardt (1989) described the primary problems that are inherent within the principalagency relationship. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of
the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what
the agent is actually doing. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the
principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the principal
and the agent prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Fama (1980) points out the failure of classical organizational theory to adequately explain
the agency problem in the modern corporation. In classical theory, the agent who personifies the
firm is the entrepreneur who is taken to be both manager and residual risk-bearer (Fama, 1980)
such that control and risk are primarily borne by the same person. This classical model fails to
explain the large modern corporation in which control of the firm is in the hands of managers
who are more or less separate from the firm’s security holders (Fama, 1980).

Since the

relationship between the stockholders and managers of a corporation fit the definition of a pure
agency relationship it should be no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the
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“separation of ownership and control” in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are
intimately associated with the general problem of agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Because principals and agents are self-interested actors possessing divergent interests, the
central dilemma of agency theory is how to properly motivate agents to perform in the best
interest of principals. Resolution of this dilemma is not possible without incurring agency cost.
The problem of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s”
welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts – at every
level of management in firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In agency theory terms, the owners
are principals and the managers are agents and there is an agency loss that is the extent to which
returns to the residual claimants, the owners, fall below what they would be if the principals, the
owners, exercised direct control of the corporation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The two
primary agency costs with which we will concern ourselves are monitoring and incentive
alignment.
Agency costs occur because of the risk that managers, having specialized skills and/or
expertise which are not completely understood or possessed by owners, will behave in ways that
are inefficient in maximizing owner wealth. In other words, there is the risk that managers will
not always make decisions in the same way that an owner would make decisions. Therefore, the
wealth maximization that is sacrificed becomes an agency cost and owners must expend
resources to acquire information regarding manager behavior, i.e. monitoring.
Incentive alignment is a control mechanism whereby managers are induced to act in the
best interests of owners by having an ownership interest in the firm such that the long-term
success of the firm benefits both owners and managers. This mechanism entails providing
managers with an outcome-based contract in which the manager will profit in the case of a
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positive outcome and will not profit otherwise. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that such contracts coalign the preferences of agents with those of the principal because the rewards for both depend
on the same actions and, therefore, the conflicts of self-interest between principal and agent are
reduced.
Agency theory predicts that the use of outcome-based (equity) contracts will not be the
preferred method of compensation when monitoring is efficient. When this is the case, the risk
to both managers and owners will be minimized giving firms a preference for behavior-based
compensation arrangements (i.e. salaries). The board of directors, which has the power to hire,
fire, and compensate senior management teams, serves to resolve conflicts of interest among
decision makers and residual risk bearers (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). Therefore, the final
authority for establishing executive compensation policy and minimizing risk to the shareholders
is the responsibility of the board of directors.
Subsequent research (Eisenhardt, 1988; Conlon and Parks, 1990) has investigated the
effect of monitoring and compensation tradition on type of compensation arrangement within
agency relationships. These organizational theorists argued, consistent with agency theory, that
when the costs of directly monitoring an individual’s actions exceed the cost of administering
incentives based on performance outcomes, performance-contingent incentives are a preferred
method of control (Conlon and Parks, 1990). As expected, Conlon and Parks (1990), like
Eisenhardt (1989), found that the ability of a principal to monitor an agent decreased the use of
performance-contingent pay.
Traditional control mechanisms, such as bonuses for exemplary performance and boards
of directors to protect shareholder wealth, have been ineffective in curbing executorial abuses.
Bebchuk et al. (2010) contend that, in light of recent massive bank failures, compensation reform
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is imperative if we are to address the corporate governance inefficiencies that have allowed
corporate executives to prosper as their firms faced financial ruin. Bebchuk et al. (2010)
investigated whether the corporate pay arrangements of Bear Stearns and Lehman provided their
executives with excessive incentives to engage in risky decision making. Bebchuk reported
evidence that the CEO’s and top executive teams of both banks received significant cash bonuses
over a seven-year period leading up to the failures with no clawback provisions in the event that
short-term performance disappeared. Additionally, CEO’s and top executives were able to
unload huge blocks of stock and options on a regular basis within a relatively short period of
time after receipt of such stocks and options.
In summary, Bebchuk et al. (2010) note the following:
The analysis indicates that the design of the firms’ performance-based
compensation did not produce a tight alignment of executives’ interests with longterm shareholder value. Rather, the design provided executives with substantial
opportunities (of which they made considerable use) to take large amounts of
compensation based on short-term gains off the table and retain it even after the
drastic reversal of the two companies’ fortunes.

Such a design of bonus

compensation provides executives with incentives to seek improvements in shortterm earnings figures even at the cost of maintaining an excessively high risk of
large losses down the road.
Clearly, the use of short-sighted performance based bonuses has failed to protect
shareholder wealth and has significantly eroded investor confidence in the ability of boards to
adequately monitor and fairly reward corporate executives.
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Say-on-Pay
This paper investigates the impact of two legislatively mandated executive compensation
policy variables: say-on-pay and clawbacks of executive compensation. . The first policy, sayon-pay, requires publicly traded firms to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on whether to
approve the compensation of executives (Davis-Polk, 2010). Shareholders should be allowed to
exercise this vote no less frequently than once every three years, at any annual or other meeting
of shareholders. Concern about corporate abuses in the area of executive compensation practices
is not limited to United States firms. Legislation giving shareholders a voice in setting executive
compensation has sprung up in many countries including the United Kingdom, Australia, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). In 2002, the United Kingdom
(UK) government began requiring, among other things, quoted companies to publish a directors’
compensation report as part of their annual reporting cycle and put the compensation report to a
non-binding (advisory) shareholder vote at the annual meeting (Alissa, 2009).

The annual

remuneration (compensation) reports provide information on both executive directors
(executives) and non-executive directors (outside board members) pay packages and plans
(Carter and Zamora, 2009). UK firms are required to seek shareholder votes on the entire
remuneration report. The UK government introduced the regulation because it believed that the
best practice disclosure regime at that time did not achieve compliance with the three
fundamental principles regarding directors’ compensation: accountability, transparency, and
performance linkage (Alissa, 2009).
Several researchers have investigated the impact of the requirement for UK firms to
publish the Directors’ Remuneration Report on shareholder activism and executive
compensation.

These studies provide particularly meaningful insights in the present

22

investigation of “say-on-pay” and executive compensation because of perceived compensatory
abuses in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Most of the prior literature regarding
compilation and shareholder approval of the Directors Remuneration Report is based on publicly
available firm data rather than experimental evidence. However, due to similarities in the 2002
UK legislation and the 2010 US legislation, both calling for increased shareholder activism and
more transparent executive compensation practices, we can use these archival studies to form a
basis for triangulation with experimental work investigating similar behavioral issues.
Using sample data from 204 public firms, listed on the London Stock Exchange, Alissa
(2009) investigated (1) whether shareholders consider the excess compensation of the CEO when
they cast their vote on the compensation report and (2) whether boards respond to shareholders’
dissatisfaction. In this study, total compensation was defined as the sum of base salary, annual
bonus (cash and stock), long-term incentive plans, share options, and other annual pay. Over the
sample period, total compensation grew by 72% while sales increased only 11%.

Alissa

developed a benchmark of expected executive compensation thereby enabling him to measure
excess compensation. He then developed a measure of voter dissatisfaction which was a ratio of
votes “against” the compensation report to all other votes, including proxy votes and “abstain”
votes. The evidence in Alissa (2009) suggests that shareholders do consider excessive executive
compensation when casting their votes in favor of or against the compensation report. Alissa
also found evidence to support the argument that boards reduce excess compensation for firms
whose CEO’s have above the mean excess compensation (Alissa, 2009).
In a subsequent study using poll data for a large sample of UK firms for the six-year
period from 2002 to 2007, Conyon and Sadler (2010) investigate shareholder activism in relation
to executive pay by way of voting outcomes on resolutions at company general meetings.
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Specifically, they investigated (1) the factors that determine shareholder dissent and (2) whether
shareholder dissent impacted executive compensation structure.

Surprisingly, Conyon and

Sadler (2010) found that only about 10% of shareholders vote against the Directors
Remuneration Report (DRR). Overwhelmingly, shareholders vote in favor of the DRR and, in
this sense, are satisfied with company executive pay policies (Conyon & Sadler, 2010). This
study also compared voting outcomes for resolutions on the DRR and other pay proposals to
voting outcomes on non-pay resolutions, such as electing a director to the board, appointing
auditors or amending the firm’s share capital. Interestingly, results indicated that shareholders
are much more likely to vote against the DRR and other pay resolutions, compared to non-pay
related resolutions (Conyon & Sadler, 2010). Ultimately, Conyon & Sadler conclude there is
little evidence that shareholder say-on-pay has consequences for subsequent CEO compensation
practices.
Other researchers, conducting similar studies of say-on-pay using UK data, have found
different results. Carter and Zamora (2009) found that the proportion of shareholder votes
disapproving the remuneration report are higher when there is higher CEO salary, weaker payfor-performance sensitivity in CEO bonus pay, and greater potential dilution from stock-based
compensation, particularly stock option pay. They also found evidence to support the argument
that corporate boards respond selectively to votes by curbing salary increases and dilution from
stock option grants, and by improving bonus pay for performance links (Carter and Zamora,
2009).
Bowlin, et al. (2010) investigated shareholder investment decisions using an experimental
economics model to determine whether say-on-pay affected level of investment. Specifically,
Bowlin, et al. compared the level of investment by shareholders in a no-say condition to level of
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investment in a voluntary vs. mandatory say-on-pay condition.

The study revealed that

shareholders who were given a say-on-pay, whether voluntary or mandatory, invested
significantly more than shareholders who were not given a say-on-pay. Bowlin, et al. further
found that, in general, boards conform to investors’ votes by returning more of the invested
amounts. This research suggests that the investment process is made more efficient by the
presence of a shareholder vote on executive compensation.
In a study of shareholder voting behavior and CEO investment behavior, Gox, et al.
(2011) devise an experimental economics model wherein a CEO must choose between a riskless
project and a risky project with payoff schemes which vary based on level of risk and
shareholder approval. Shareholder say on pay is manipulated by varying the strength of the
shareholder vote in the following treatment conditions: no say on pay, advisory shareholder
vote, unconditionally binding shareholder vote, and conditionally binding shareholder vote.
Gox, et al. (2011) find that only when shareholders have an unconditionally binding vote is
executive compensation curbed. However, this situation also fails to motivate CEO’s to take
appropriate risks in securing firm profits. Further, shareholders generally oppose executive
bonuses in favor of greater dividends regardless of whether say on pay is binding or not. This
effect is more pronounced when firm performance is poor. Gox, et al. (2011) find that nonenforceable shareholder voting rights do not curb excessive executive compensation and, in fact,
seem to motivate CEO’s to demand higher bonuses than would be required if shareholders had
no vote on executive compensation.
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Clawbacks
The Dodd-Frank Act provides that the SEC must, by rule, direct national securities
exchanges and associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that does not
implement a policy providing (1) for disclosure of the issuer’s policy on incentive-based
compensation that is based on financial information, and (2) that the issuer will recover (i.e.
clawback) incentive compensation paid to certain current or former executive officers in the
event the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material
noncompliance with any financial reporting requirements (Davis-Polk, 2010). This penalty is
enforced without regard to managerial intent and is directed at managers who report favorable
financial results that prove to be illusory. Thus, clawbacks provide a strong economic incentive
to accurately report financial information and to more carefully reward managerial performance.
Clawback is defined as the recovery of incentive compensation from executives in the
event that financial statements, upon which incentive compensation is contingent, are restated.
Incentive compensation is awarded to top executives as recognition of company performance
that exceeds some predetermined threshold. For this purpose, “performance” is measured in
terms of reported financial information.

If such information is later restated because of

noncompliance with financial reporting requirements, under a clawback arrangement, executives
can, and should, be required to pay back any incentive awards or bonuses received depending
upon the time frame of the restatement.
The Dodd-Frank Act explicitly requires that publicly traded firms have a clawback policy
in place (P.L. 111-203, Sec. 954). However, this is not the first legislation to require clawbacks.
Two prior statutorily imposed clawbacks can be found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009(ARRA) (Earle, 2010). Although
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clawbacks have been used in the past to ensure proper alignment of owner/agent interests,
legislatively imposed controls have become increasingly more stringent in response to corporate
abuses. For example, the clawback provision in SOX applied only to the CEO while the
clawback provision in ARRA applies to the CEO in addition to a large number of top executives.
SOX required executive misconduct before compensation could be clawed back whereas ARRA
requires only materially inaccurate financial statements. Under SOX, only the SEC could claw
back compensation, but now that ARRA has become effective, the company, rather than the
government, is charged with exercising clawback rights (Earle, 2010).
In complying with the Dodd-Frank legislation, mandated practices with respect to
clawbacks are even more stringent than previously required. For example, any public company
that does not adequately disclose its policy on incentive-based compensation shall not be listed
on a national exchange. Further, all listed firms must implement a policy allowing the recovery
of incentive compensation paid to current or former executive officers in the event of financial
restatement due to noncompliance. Finally, firms are required to make disclosures about (1) the
median annual total compensation of all employees; (2) the annual total compensation of the
CEO; and (3) the ratio of the median employee annual total compensation to that of the CEO
(Davis-Polk, 2010).
Addy, Chu and Yoder (2009) investigated the emergence of clawback provisions for
bonus recovery in the event of restated financials. Addy et al. (2009) imply that managerial
power has a direct bearing on whether or not a company has clawback provisions in place.
Building on that theory, they construct an index of the relative influence of management
compared to independent monitoring by boards of directors. A low score on the index indicates
that management is influential in setting policies and direction. Conversely, a high score on the
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index indicates that independent monitors (i.e. boards) have more say in determining policies and
direction. Their findings, consistent with both managerial power theory and agency theory,
indicate that when the index indicates more influence by management, a clawback provision is
less likely.
Given that enforcement of the new clawback provisions are not voluntary, corporate
boards are now directly accountable to both shareholders and regulators for more objectively
monitoring the compensation of corporate executives. Boards are often inefficient at exercising
the control necessary to curb managerial abuses with regard to executive compensation. In fact,
many corporate boards are chaired by the company’s CEO. Although the clawback is not
directly imposed on the board of directors, the board is required to enforce this penalty, requiring
boards to fulfill their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders thereby requiring a higher level of
objectivity than previously demonstrated.

Trust
Basic disregard for shareholder trust is at the heart of the controversy surrounding
executive compensation. Swift (2001) defines trust in the context of economic exchange as the
confident expectation, based upon the predictability of another party’s behavior, that one’s
interests will not be harmed or put at risk by the other party. According to Swift, a condition of
mutual vulnerability is inherent in transactional situations due to the uncertainty or risk that the
parties in an exchange relationship may not behave predictably (p. 19). Because of this mutual
vulnerability, a variety of institutional mechanisms can be initiated to simulate or artificially
create trust. Research in this genre is predominantly concerned with ex post contract analysis of
business relationships, and finds that, in general, legalistic means designed to restore trust are in
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fact associated with causing higher levels of distrust (Shapiro, 1987, Ring, 1996). Swift (2001)
argues that in a relationship that is truly based on trust, each party stands to lose something of
significant benefit if the other defaults. The risk that both parties will be adversely affected if
one or the other reneges on the relationship is a sufficient condition to ensure that the
relationship works (Swift, 2001).
This type of trust is not regarded as a sufficient condition for the effective social control
of business behavior, however, trust based on mutual vulnerability is promoted as an antidote to
managerial opportunism (Swift, 2001). CEOs have demonstrated that they have the power to
abuse their positions of influence by over-compensating themselves with exorbitant salaries and
non-performance based cash bonuses, all under the watchful eye of ineffective boards of
directors. It is unknown at the present time whether control mechanisms such as say-on-pay and
clawbacks will improve shareholder trust, as is the intent of current legislative reform, or
whether such reforms will have the adverse effect of eroding trust in the corporate governance
process.
Zand (1972) found that in situations where trust is present, the trusted tend to disclose
more accurate, relevant and complete information, whereas the trusting feel less need to impose
social controls in order to gain access to or influence over information. Regardless of whether
trust is a product of institutional mechanisms or it is generated as a byproduct of mutual
vulnerability, trust in our business process is essential if our economic markets are to survive.
In fact, economists Paul Zak and Stephen Knack found that trust is among the strongest
predictors of a nation’s wealth (Chen and Krakovsky, 2010, p 151). Zak argues that low trust
countries are poor because their citizens are reluctant to make the sort of investments that create

29

jobs and raise incomes (p. 151). In the next section, we explore the relationship between trust
and trustworthy behavior as well as the impact of each on economic outcomes.

Trust Game Literature
Most of what we have learned about trust and trustworthy behavior has been the result of
extensive research within the field of experimental economics. Economics researchers have
conducted thousands of experiments using trust games, investment games, ultimatum games,
dictator games, and many others that belong to the paradigm of investigation known as game
theory, to explain the behavioral aspects of economic interaction among rational players. Both
trust and investment games are designed such that players are randomly paired with a player in
another location. Players are not allowed to talk to each other as this may influence the outcome
of the experiment. At the beginning of the experiment, each player is given an endowment,
sometimes referred to as a show-up fee. The first person to play, also referred to as the trustor,
makes a choice to keep her6 endowment or give it to the second player in the hope of a greater
return. This decision is an observable act of trust or no trust and is intended to simulate an
investment decision. Assuming the first player trusts, the second player, also commonly referred
to as the trustee, must decide whether and how much he will return to the first player. This
decision is an observable measure of trustworthy behavior and is intended to simulate manager
behavior. Economic theory dictates that the first player will behave in a purely self-interested
manner, keeping her original endowment and thus ending the game.
By using carefully designed trust games in an experimental setting, we can more fully
understand various aspects of economic exchange including how and why people cooperate with

6

In this paper, Player 1 will be referred to as she and Player 2 will be referred to as he. This is the customary
convention and is merely a convenience to avoid confusion in referring to both players as he or she.
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each other, how they make investment decisions, what happens when people are treated unfairly,
and why they choose to trust one another. As one researcher put it, when rational people interact
voluntarily in ways that lead to persistent inefficiencies – this is the heart of the prisoner’s
dilemma – then institutional designers have a problem to solve: devise institutions that realign
individual incentives to achieve collectively rational outcomes (Scalet, 2006).
Trust game literature in economics. In a seminal work integrating the study of trust
and reciprocity, Berg, et al. (1995) designed an investment game to analyze both the trusting
aspects and the cooperative aspects of behavior in an economic exchange. To control for
potential confounding factors such as reputations from repeat interactions, contractual precommitments, and potential punishment threats, subjects were not allowed to communicate with
each other, they were allowed to play the investment game only once and their identities were
kept totally anonymous. The researchers found positive investments still occurred suggesting
that trust is an economic primitive (p. 123).
The investment game, as designed by Berg et al. (1995), is played as follows. Subjects
are randomly assigned to a Room A and a Room B. Each is given a show-up fee of $10. Room
B participants pocket their show-up fee while Room A participants must decide how much to
“invest” with an anonymous counterpart in Room B.

Room A players are referred to as

“trustors” and Room B players are referred to as “trustees”. Room A players may invest any
sum of money between zero and $10 which will be tripled before reaching the player in Room B.
The trustee/reciprocator will then decide how much of the “invested” amount to return to the
trustor. The amount of money returned can be between zero and $30. The amount of money
sent by the Room A player indicates the level of trust and the amount of money returned by the
Room B player indicates the level of trustworthiness he possesses. Economic theory predicts
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that trustors will not invest any amount of money choosing instead to keep their show-up fee of
$10 thereby ending the game.
Berg, et al. (1995) identified an experimental design where trust can be used for mutual
gain (p. 137). Self-interest alone could not explain their results. One explanation of the data is
that room A subjects were willing to place a trust, by risking some amount of money, in the
belief that there would be reciprocity; the room B subjects who reciprocated kept this trust. In
the first trial (no history group), two-thirds of the room B subjects did not reciprocate. The
researchers speculated that this lack of reciprocity may have been because room B subjects did
not perceive the actions of room A subjects to be a placement of trust. To investigate this
possibility, a second trial was conducted (history group) in which room B subjects were given
information about the results of the first experiment. Evidence from the “social history” group
indicates that when trust is made more salient, reciprocity is greater. Subjects’ propensity to
believe in and use trust increased (p. 137).
This behavior observed in Berg et al. (1995) is analogous to an investment situation
where investors may be viewed as trustors and firms may be viewed as being either trustworthy
or not. By investing in a publicly traded firm, shareholders exhibit trusting behavior. There is a
presumed expectation that managers will reciprocate by acting in the best interest of shareholders
to maximize firm profitability and return a fair amount of that profit to investors.

In this study,

we are particularly interested in the trust/reciprocity relationship with respect to executive
compensation. We consider the control mechanisms of say-on-pay and clawbacks of executive
compensation both individually and collectively with respect to their impact on trust from
shareholders and trustworthy behavior from managers.
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In a study on the reciprocal aspect of a trust relationship, McCabe et al. (2003) defined
reciprocity as trustworthy behavior in response to an initial trusting action. Positive reciprocity
(i.e. trustworthiness) can be described as the costly behavior of a second mover that rewards a
first mover based on both the gains from exchange to the second mover as well as the second
mover’s beliefs about the intentions motivating the action of the first mover (p. 269). In other
words, reciprocity can occur only when the first mover in a trust game decides to forgo the
rational choice to keep his original endowment causing each player to realize a payoff of less
than would be received if the players cooperated.

If the first mover keeps his original

endowment rather than risk losing it to the second mover in hopes of receiving a greater return,
he has made a decision not to trust. Alternatively, the first mover may trust the second mover to
act in a trustworthy manner by reciprocating trust such that each player is better off after the
second mover plays.

If the game is successful, both players will cooperate to ensure an

economically superior outcome. In other words, player 1 will give his endowment to player 2,
the endowment will be tripled by the researcher, and player 2 will return an amount to player 1
that is greater than his original investment.
To test the effect of signaling trust, McCabe et al. (2003), designed a trust game that
included two treatments: a voluntary trust condition and an involuntary trust condition. The only
difference between the two treatments is that in the involuntary condition, Player 1 does not have
an option to simply keep her endowment. Rather, Player 1 must invest, leaving Player 2 with
the decision of how much to return to Player 1. By eliminating Player 1’s opportunity cost
associated with playing, the researchers restricted Player 2’s ability to read his counterpart’s
intentions unambiguously (p. 273). In the voluntary trust condition, an intentional investment by
Player 1 can be interpreted by Player 2 as an act of trust (p. 273). In the involuntary trust
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condition, this signal of trusting behavior is removed thereby inhibiting the ability of Player 2 to
read the intentions of Player 1. As predicted by the trust-reciprocity hypothesis, cooperative play
occurs significantly less often in the involuntary trust game.
The act of giving up a certain $10 payoff by the first mover in the trust game designed by
McCabe et al. (2003) is a signal to the second mover that he is being trusted to act in a
trustworthy manner. A similar but stronger signaling effect is achieved in Berg et al. (1995) by
telling second movers about the history of prior trials of the investment game wherein first
movers give up their original endowment in the hope of receiving a greater return later in the
experiment. Indeed, in both cases, reciprocity (i.e. return) is improved whether by second
movers’ perception of first movers’ intention to trust or by knowledge of observed trusting
behavior.
Monitoring/Crowding-Out. Bohnet et al. (2001) extend the principals of trust and
trustworthiness to a contract game wherein offering a contract is a matter of trust, and
performing it, a matter of trustworthiness. “A contractual relationship is represented by a game
in which the first mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing
whether the second mover will perform. If the second mover breaches, a chance move decides
whether he is held liable for the cost of breach. Standard economic theory predicts that the
higher the expected cost of breach, the more likely is the second mover to perform. Again, we
can apply this reasoning to the current governance environment with respect to executive
compensation.

Mandatory clawback of executive compensation in the event of financial

restatement is equivalent to a contractual relationship in which investors must rely on the
performance/trustworthiness of managers to accurately report corporate performance upon which
contractual bonuses are calculated. In the event that the contract is breached (i.e. financials are
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restated) some part or all of the previously awarded executive compensation must be clawed
back.
Bohnet et al. (2001) find that at low levels of legal contract enforcement, trustworthiness
is increased. Because first movers cannot trust the legal system, they enter a contract only if they
can trust the second mover. They are careful about the decision, which makes trustworthiness a
successful trait (p. 141). Conversely, at high levels of contract enforcement, trustworthiness is
high and trust is observed because second movers are deterred from breaching. However, at
intermediate levels of enforcement, behavior is more difficult to predict. In this early study of
the crowding out effect of legal rules on trust and trustworthiness, Bohnet et al. (2001) state the
following:
At intermediate levels of enforcement…interpersonal trust is replaced by
institutional trust in the legal system, and genuine trustworthiness is crowded out.
More order can result from less law, which yields a “motivation-compatible”
environment (Bohnet and Frey, 1997), and from more law, which yields an
incentive-compatible environment.
In other research on the effects of monitoring, Dickinson and Villeval (2008) conducted a
monitoring game wherein a randomly paired principal and agent work together to accomplish a
task. The principal offers a contract to the agent wherein the agent’s wage corresponds to a level
of output. The principal then chooses a monitoring intensity which represents a probability of
audit. If shirking is verified, the principal punishes the agent with a lower wage. Reciprocity is
manipulated by fixing the principal’s pay in one treatment condition while allowing it to be
variable in a second treatment condition. In the second treatment condition, the principal’s pay
varies directly with agent output. Consistent with agency theory, this research supports the
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conclusion that, in general, increased monitoring results in greater output. However, increases
in monitoring have a negative impact on output when the principal-agent relationship is
interpersonal. No such decline in productivity is observed when the employment relationship is
more distant. Dickinson and Villeval (2008) further find that crowding out functions primarily
through reciprocity rather than an intrinsic loss of motivation because the observed decline only
occurs in the variable condition where the principal’s pay is linked to agent effort. This is the
only condition where increased monitoring by the principal can be reciprocated with a decline in
output. The same decline is not observed in the fixed condition where the principal’s earnings
cannot be affected by the agent.
Pre-play commitments and punishment.

Bracht and Feltovich (2008) tested the

economic as well as the behavioral effect of a precommitment mechanism as a modification to
the basic trust game to determine if efficiency was improved. They allowed Player 2's to escrow
a certain amount of money before Player 1's made their investment decision. If Player 1 did not
invest or if Player 1 did invest and Player 2 split the successful investment, the escrow amount
was returned to Player 2. However, if Player 2 acted opportunistically, the escrow amount was
lost (i.e. returned to the experimenter's budget). Player 2 was given the choice to escrow a high
amount or low amount in two of the experimental groups and in two other experimental groups,
the escrow amount was mandated. The experiment also included one group where the basic trust
game was played. As predicted by game theory, high escrow resulted in successful investing and
splitting, regardless of whether the escrow was voluntarily or mandatorily selected. Bracht and
Feltovich (2008) found weak support for the crowding-out theory in that when an escrow amount
was possible and a zero escrow amount was chosen, investment and splitting was lower than
when an escrow amount was not possible. Signaling was found to be more strongly supported in
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the early rounds of play but the effect disappeared over time. When the highest escrow amount
possible (even if it was a small amount) was chosen, investment and splitting occurred with
substantially higher frequency. However, the researchers concluded that the disappearance of
this effect in later rounds was an indication that the investors had been mistaken in their
interpretation of the escrow decision as a signal.
Houser et al. (2008) investigated whether punishment threats influenced trustee decisions
differently when such threats were intentional rather than when the threats were randomly
imposed with no intent to punish. They conducted a trust game where the investor could send
some, all or none of his initial endowment.

As is usually the case in a trust game, the

endowment was tripled by the experimenter before being passed to the trustee who could then
return some, all or none of the tripled amount to the investor. What makes this game unique is
that the investors were allowed to express a desired back-transfer amount before making their
investment decision. They were also allowed, in some cases to impose a sanction if the amount
returned was less than the desired back-transfer amount. Houser et al. (2008) found that, in
general, trustees return more when threats of punishment exist, regardless of whether the threat is
imposed voluntarily by the investor or randomly by nature. They also find that sanctions
increase returns when back-transfer requests are low but work in the opposite direction when
requests are high. Houser et al. conclude that incentives, rather than intentions, underlie return
decisions. These results also support crowding out theory by revealing that "sanction threats
change individuals' perceptions of the environment, and can reduce internal motivations for
cooperation" (p. 523).
In a rather uniquely designed trust game, Abbink et al. (2000) use a moonlighting context
to test the effect of a non-binding, pre-pay contract on trust and reciprocity. In their game, both
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Player A and Player B are given an initial endowment of $12 (they use fictitious currency).
Player A can take money from Player B or give money to him, up to $6 either way. After the
money is tripled by the researcher, Player B can return up to $18 to Player A or spend up to $6 to
reduce Player A's payoff by triple the amount spent. Neither Player A nor Player B can have a
negative amount at any time during the game. In one condition, Player B could propose a nonbinding contract before play began and Player A could accept or reject it but neither decision was
binding on either Player A or Player B. Abbink et al. (2000) found that hostile actions are
punished with much more consistency than friendly actions are rewarded. They also found that
non-binding contracts elicit trust by Player A's but not necessarily reciprocity by Player B's.
More often than not, Player B's acted according to the self-interested predictions of classical
economic theory.
Researchers often study trust and trustworthiness by using a one-shot game design which
controls for the possibility of reputation effects.7 Dickhaut et al. (2008) successfully argued that
in a multiple round trust game, first movers would continue to trust as long as second movers
reciprocated. As for second movers, Dickhaut et al. provide strong support for the argument that
non-trustworthy types will seek to build reputations in the early rounds as trustworthy types but
will defect in later rounds. To demonstrate this tendency, an experiment was conducted to
analyze trust and reciprocity in a one shot trust game as compared to a two-round trust game.
This study showed that reciprocity was much higher in the first round of the multiple round
game. However, in the second round, there was a sharp drop in reciprocity producing results
which were quite similar to those in the one-shot game. These findings were also consistent with

7

Prior literature on trust using a one-shot design includes Cox (2004), Deck (2009) and the seminal work of Berg et
al. (1995).
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comparisons made between experienced and non-experienced players suggesting that reputation
is a significant factor in repeated economic exchange.
Trust game literature in accounting. There are very few experimental economics
studies within the field of accounting and even fewer that examine the notion of trust utilizing a
trust game. One very recent accounting study (Bowlin et al., 2010) , discussed in previous
sections, investigated the effects of say-on-pay with regard to investors’ perceptions of trust
using a three person trust game to determine whether investment increased as a result of
shareholder voice. Additionally, Bowlin et al. (2010) investigated whether shareholders invest
more when the say-on-pay is granted voluntarily rather than mandated by the government.
Findings from the Bowlin, et al. study suggest that regardless of whether say-on-pay is voluntary
or mandatory, shareholders invest more when they are allowed to express an opinion.
Coletti, et al. (2005) conducted two experiments to explore the impact of controls on trust
and cooperation in collaborative environments. The first experiment, of particular relevance in
the present study, investigated whether controls have a positive impact on trust. Subjects were
randomly assigned to one of two treatment conditions where controls were either present or
absent. Participants were randomly paired and assigned the role of either collaborator or
observer. Collaborators were managers who were charged with making decisions regarding the
allocation of funds to R&D projects while observers had to make judgments regarding the
trustworthiness of the collaborators. In the control condition, participants were instructed that a
consultant would make periodic, unannounced visits and would report the results of that visit
back to top management, likely resulting in penalties if investment decisions were poorly made.
In the no control condition, the threat of a consultant visit was removed.
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Coletti et al. (2005) find that: (1) participants cooperate more in the control system
condition; (2) observers rate the participants assigned to the control system condition as more
trustworthy than those assigned to the no control system condition; and (3) the presence of a
control system enhances the level of trust in a collaborative setting. In fact, Colletti et al. report
that cooperation perfectly mediates the relationship between perceived trustworthiness and the
control system, in that the direct effect of the control system on perceived trustworthiness is not
significant when the effect of cooperation is controlled (p 490).
Accounting researchers, like experimental economists, have investigated the crowding
out theory which suggests that increased controls actually undermine trust which, in turn,
reduces productivity.

For example, in Seal and Vincent-Jones (1997), McMaster (1995)

contends that insurance, monitoring, sanctions, litigation and performance rewards are all
imperfect substitutes for trust, and that the use of any of these substitutes may signal distrust.
Further, Neu (1991) states that the “irony of contracting” is that efficient contracting cannot take
place other than in an environment of trust, but the introduction of a contract in such an
environment may result in the breakdown of trust (Seal and Vincent-Jones, 1997).
These findings, although contradictory, are particularly relevant in the present study
because say-on-pay and clawbacks are formally imposed controls which are being legislatively
mandated in an attempt to reform executive compensation practices and strengthen investor trust.
It is unclear at the present time whether the control mechanisms investigated in this study will
have the intended effect of strengthening investor trust or eroding it.
Experimental results from the studies described above can be interpreted as emulating
behavior in an actual investment setting where board members must set executive compensation
with knowledge of shareholder expectation. The communication from shareholders regarding
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approval or disapproval of executive compensation is a signal of shareholder trust.

By

exercising their right to express an opinion regarding the compensation of corporate executives,
shareholders are signaling their desire to participate in the governance process as well as their
faith that corporate boards will protect their interests. Knowledge of shareholder trust then
becomes more salient in the minds of managers who must choose whether to act in a trustworthy
manner or not. However, the question of whether managers need additional incentive to fairly
reciprocate shareholder trust remains.
Although say-on-pay has been shown to increase shareholder trust, thereby increasing
shareholder investment (Bowlin, et al. 2007), it is as yet unknown what effect the additional
protection of a clawback provision will have on either shareholder investment or manager
reciprocity. The clawback provision may prevent a perverse outcome in the sense that say-onpay induces greater investment with no consequent increase in manager reciprocity. It may also
be the case, as in Colleti, 2005, that managers who are subject to greater controls will cooperate
to a greater extent, and that when such cooperation is observed, shareholders will become more
trusting. Therefore, the current study is needed to extend the research on trust and reciprocity
and to investigate the policy implications of the Dodd-Frank Act.
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CHAPTER 3 - EXPERIMENT
Game Design
We utilize a two-stage, multiple-round investment game to observe the behavioral
interactions between first and second movers in a modified investment game. In a typical
investment game, subjects assume the role of either shareholder or manager with both subjects
receiving an initial endowment. Stage one of the game requires a decision from the shareholder
about whether to keep her endowment or invest it, hoping to earn a greater return. If the
shareholder chooses to invest, the investment is immediately successful in that it is tripled by the
experimenter before being passed to the manager. In stage two of the game, the manager must
decide whether to return any part of the successful investment to the shareholder. If the game is
optimally efficient, both players will be economically better off by cooperating.

This

cooperation, however, requires shareholders to trust that managers will return a positive amount
greater than the shareholder’s original investment thereby demonstrating trustworthiness. If the
shareholder decides not to trust the manager, both players will keep their original investment and
the game will end.
In the current study, this basic trust game is modified such that in each of our treatment
conditions the manager makes the first move by offering a pre-play assertion to the shareholder
about the amount to be returned should the shareholder choose to invest. Neither player is bound
by this assertion which is analogous to a financial statement assertion by management.
Managers may actually return more or less than indicated by the pre-play assertion. However, if
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they return less than their stated amount, managers in the clawback conditions may be subject to
a significant penalty.
Our experiment consists of four treatment conditions wherein we manipulate two
independent policy variables (i.e. say-on-pay and clawbacks) in a 2 x 2 between-subjects design
as described in the following section. In all conditions, subjects will be randomly paired and will
play together as a shareholder-manager dyad throughout all three rounds of the multiple-round
games. The four treatment conditions include the following: no say, no clawback; say-on-pay
only; clawback only; and say-on-pay with clawback.

Independent Variables
The presence/absence of say-on-pay is manipulated by allowing shareholders to
communicate with managers about the amount of money that they would like to have returned to
them (the equivalent of the amount they would like for managers to keep, which is exactly the
meaning of say-on-pay) should they choose to invest their endowment. Each game consists of
three rounds of play with say-on-pay being mandatory in the first round but optional in the
second and third rounds, meaning that in the second and third rounds, shareholders may, if they
choose to do so, tell managers how much money they would like to get back. This aspect of the
game is consistent with a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act which allows shareholders to express
a say on pay not less than once every three years, with the exact frequency to be determined by a
vote of the shareholders. In an actual investment environment, shareholders can choose to vote
every year, every other year, or every third year. Again, as is true in an actual investment
setting, this expressly stated expected return is not binding on either shareholders or managers.
Shareholders will express their “say” by writing in the preferred return amount on an investment
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return form when making their investment decision. The indicated amount will constitute a
counter-offer to managers who will have begun the game with an assertion, written in on the
same investment form, of how much they intend to return if given the opportunity.
In the second stage of the game managers must decide whether or not to return money to
shareholders. A manager who returns any amount less than the amount stated in his pre-play
assertion is deemed to have “misled” his investors with a faulty assertion and must, therefore,
face the threat of punishment in the form of clawed back earnings. We implement enforcement
of a clawback policy by giving shareholders a 50% chance for recovery of any invested amounts
plus the earnings contributed by the experimenter. In other words, a manager who demonstrates
untrustworthy behavior may have all of his ill-gotten gains clawed back.
The current study contributes to the overall body of research utilizing experimental
methods to investigate the impact of say on pay with respect to shareholder investment (Gox et
al. 2011; Bowlin et al. 2011) as well as clawbacks of executive compensation with respect to
manager behavior (Hodge and Winn, 2011).

Our design allows us to test specific policy

requirements instituted by the Dodd-Frank Act. The trust game we use, which was adapted from
Berg at al. (1995), incorporates the real-world shareholder protections of say-on-pay and
clawbacks allowing us to examine the potential impact of increased regulation on trust and
reciprocal behavior for interactions between investors/shareholders and firms/managers .
A number of observations are made on how shareholders and managers behave in terms
of investment and return, focusing on: managers’ initial offers, shareholders’ counter-offers,
shareholders’ investment decisions (frequency of investment), and managers’ decisions on the
amount of money to return. The design of this experiment is such that shareholders are not
allowed to vary the amount of investment. Therefore, trust is measured by tracking the number
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of times that first movers choose to invest their endowment over the three rounds of play.
Conversely, managers are allowed to return any amount between zero and the tripled amount of
investment (i.e. $12). However, managers must also comply with the self-imposed benchmark
created by their pre-play assertion to avoid clawbacks in certain treatment conditions. Therefore,
trustworthiness is measured by the amount of money returned in addition to the number of
instances where actual return was equal to or greater than anticipated return.

Game Procedures
Prior to the experimental session, participants were randomly seated in one of two rooms
to prevent any communication which might bias the results of this study. All participants were
recruited from a student population and randomly assigned the role of either shareholder (seated
in Room A) or manager (seated in Room B). Subjects are also randomly assigned to one of the
four treatment conditions described below. Regardless of the treatment condition, shareholders
and managers each received a voucher indicating a worth of $4 at the beginning of their
respective experimental session. After the players were randomly assigned to one of the two
roles, seated in separate rooms and given their initial endowment, general instructions were read
by the researcher instructing players not communicate with each other.

Next, specific

instructions were read which described the procedures of the game, and examples were provided
regarding possible outcomes. Play continued in each experimental condition until players had
completed three rounds. Upon completion of all three rounds, players were paid according to
their earnings in one randomly chosen round.
Shareholders exhibited trust if they chose to invest their initial endowment.

The

principles that are central to game theory, dominance and backward induction, posit that the first
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mover will anticipate self-interested behavior by the second mover and will, therefore, apply a
dominant strategy of receiving an immediate positive amount rather than nothing at all.
However, a vast body of prior literature shows that Players often do not play this strategy,
choosing instead to believe that second movers will repay their trust by returning an amount
greater than the original investment. Managers are said to exhibit trustworthy behavior if they
“keep the trust” by reciprocating. Positive reciprocity can be described as the costly behavior of
a second mover that rewards a first mover based on both the gains from exchange to the second
mover as well as the second mover’s beliefs about the intentions motivating the action of the first
mover (McCabe et al., 2003).

As a matter of convenience, we will refer to Player 1s

(shareholders) as female and Player 2s (managers) as male.8
In the first phase of the experiment, for all treatment conditions, both Player 1 and Player
2 participants were given the same general instructions regarding the game before they were
randomly assigned to their respective roles as either shareholder or manager. After the general
instructions were read, the randomly chosen shareholder participants were taken to a separate
room (Room A) where they remained until the conclusion of the experiment. Managers then
received specific procedural instructions along with illustrative examples to help with
understanding the rules of the game.

No Say-on-Pay, No Clawback Treatment Group
In the no say-on-pay, no clawback group, each manager was given an envelope
containing two color-coded forms: a voucher worth $4 and an Investment Return Form A. This
player had to decide how much to return to his shareholder counterpart if the shareholder chose
to invest her initial endowment. The player was also required to record his initial offer on the
8

This convention is adopted by Kreps (1990)
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investment return form which was then placed in an envelope and later given to the shareholder
counterpart.

Manager participants retained their $4 voucher for payment following the

experiment.
In the second phase of the experiment, shareholders received the specific procedural
instructions along with illustrative examples to help with understanding the rules of the game.
Each shareholder had to decide whether to give her initial endowment to a randomly assigned
manager. The shareholder was also required to record her decision by answering “yes” or “no”
to the question “Do you want to give the initial endowment to Player 2?” on the Investment
Return Form A provided. If she decided to invest, the shareholder had to give the entire amount
which was then tripled by the researcher and given to the paired manager in Room B. If the
shareholder decided not to invest, the game was over and each player kept the original
endowment. After the investment decision was made, and all rounds of the game had been
completed, each shareholder completed a short questionnaire providing demographic information
in addition to minimal information regarding trusting and trustworthy behavior.

The post-

experiment questionnaire included a manipulation check to ensure that each participant could
correctly identify the condition to which he or she was assigned (refer to Appendix B).
After shareholder decisions were recorded, the third phase of the experiment began with
manager participants in Room B. Each manager was seated with either one envelope or two
envelopes being placed in front of him. Managers who only had one envelope were instructed to
verify that they had a voucher worth $4. Managers who had two envelopes learned that a
randomly paired shareholder had invested her $4 endowment. The original investment had been
tripled by the researcher, giving the manager a total of $16. The manager then decided how
much to return to the shareholder. He could have chosen to return any of the tripled investment,
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up to a maximum of $12, or he could have chosen to keep the entire amount. Managers
indicated their actual return on Investment Return Form B.
Upon completion of the final round of the experiment, managers completed a short
questionnaire providing demographic information in addition to minimal information regarding
trusting and trustworthy behavior. The post-experiment questionnaire included a manipulation
check to ensure that each participant could correctly identify the condition to which he or she
was assigned (refer to Appendix B). The players were paid according to their earnings in one of
the three experimental rounds chosen at random.

Say-on-Pay Treatment Group
This treatment condition was procedurally identical to the no-say, no clawback treatment
condition with the following exception. In round 1 of the game, prior to making an investment
decision, shareholders were instructed to inform the manager counterpart of their expected
return. Research assistants verified that an expected return was written on the investment return
form before it was returned to the paired manager. In rounds 2 and 3 of the game, before the
investment decision was recorded, shareholders were instructed that they could inform their
respective managers about their expected return, however, this stated expectation was not
required. In other words, in the second and third rounds of the game, shareholders could have
chosen to invest or not invest without expressly stating what they expected the manager to return
to them.
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Clawback Treatment Group
This treatment condition was procedurally identical to the no-say, no clawback treatment
condition with the following exception. To manipulate the presence of a clawback provision,
shareholders were instructed that if managers returned an amount less than the amount originally
indicated by the manager on the Investment Return Form A, she had a 50% chance of recovering
the entire amount invested. In this treatment condition, a manager could forfeit the entire
investment if he misled a shareholder with his original pre-play assertion.

Say-on-Pay and Clawback Treatment Group
This treatment condition was procedurally identical to the no-say, no clawback treatment
condition with the following exceptions. Prior to making an investment decision, shareholders
had to indicate on their Investment Return Form A how much they expected managers to return
to them. The stated expectation was a requirement in round one of the game but was optional in
rounds two and three. In round 1 of the game, research assistants verified that an expected return
was written on the investment return form before it was passed along to the manager. In
subsequent rounds of the game, before the investment decision was recorded, shareholders were
instructed that they could express a desired amount of return from their respective managers but
the stated expectation was purely voluntary. In other words, in the second and third rounds of
the game, shareholders could have chosen to invest or not invest without expressly stating what
they expected the manager to return to them. To manipulate the presence of a clawback
provision in this treatment condition, shareholders were instructed that if managers returned an
amount that was less than the amount originally indicated by the manager on the Investment
Return Form A, she had a 50% chance of recovering the entire amount invested. In this
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treatment condition, a manager could have forfeited the entire investment if he misled a
shareholder with his original pre-play assertion.
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CHAPTER 4 – PREDICTIONS
Issues to be investigated in the study
In this study, we examined the effects of Say-On-Pay (Say) and Clawback, two major
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act (D-F), on executive compensation, on shareholders’ investing
decisions and managers’ responses in returning shareholders’ investments. The two provisions of
D-F are construed in this study as creating a new dynamic of interactions between investors and
managers. We design a trust game, described in detail in the previous chapter, to map such
dynamics and conduct experiments to determine the outcome of the games as a way to examine
the potential effects of the provisions.
We employ a 2x2 game design which allows us to experimentally compare the following
four conditions representing four possible policy choices: no-Say and no-Clawback, Say only,
Clawback only, and Say with Clawback. The game setting and process reflect, sketchily, a
business cycle of investment and return. It starts with the initial financial reporting from the
manager that forms investors’/shareholders’ expectations of the return. Say is inserted by DoddFrank to be a new component at this phase of the cycle – in game-theoretical terms, Say is a
counter-offer to the manager’s offer made in the initial financial statements. The cycle continues
as an investment decision (whether or not to invest) is made, which is followed by the actual
return from the manager. Clawback is imposed here as a penalty measure against the manager’s
failure to deliver. The game is designed so that this failure is attributable only to the manager’s
own wrongdoing (i.e., not caused by any “environmental” factors that would allow the manager
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to claim innocent). In this game, the manager’s unwillingness to give back the offered amount to
the shareholder is the only reason why the manager fails to deliver, which is consistent with the
intention of the provision.
The multi-stage trust game, designed based on the two provisions of Dodd-Frank, allows
us to examine the impact of such provisions on a wide range of behavior involving both
investors/shareholders and managers. This series of investor/shareholder and manager behaviors,
in the context of Dodd-Frank, have been rarely studied in academic literature. We found a small
number of studies on Say (Bowlin et al. 2010; Alissa 2009; Carter and Zamora 2009; and Gox et
al. 2012 ), as well as a small number of studies on clawbacks (Hodge and Winn 2012; DeHaan et
al. 2011) and no study to date on the two Dodd-Frank provisions together. The current research
investigates the investment-return cycle, and attempts to address the impact of Dodd-Frank on
the following categories of observable behavior:
(1) Manager’s offer (initial financial reporting);
(2) Shareholder’s counter-offer (Say);
(3) Shareholder’s investment decisions;
(4) Manager’s return (possibility of management fraud);
(5) Shareholder’s decisions on whether to exercise Say.
These types of behavior are examined experimentally from a game-theoretic perspective.
Specifically, we examine the following issues:
(1) how managers’ offers might be different under four alternative conditions;
(2) how shareholders’ counter-offers (Say) might be different with Clawback;
(3) the extent of trust (as measured by the frequency of investment) the shareholder might
give to the manager under four alternative conditions;
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(4) the extent of reciprocity (as measured by the amount of return) from the manager;
(5) the frequency of using counter-offer as an option;
(6) How fairness plays in this game.
Our predictions are based on the experimental economics literature. Where issues are not
currently addressed or directly addressed in the existing literature – for example, issue (5) above,
we treat them as exploratory issues and offer our predictions on relevant but indirect empirical
evidence/reasoning.

Predictions
The pre-Dodd-Frank condition (no-Say and no-Clawback) is such that the manager
makes an offer (the initial financial reporting) to induce investment, and when failing to deliver,
there is no economic penalty for overstatement (as far as Dodd-Frank is concerned). Since the
offer is to induce investment, there is no incentive to offer low. With no penalty for
overstatement, the rational choice is to offer high. Knowing that there might be a counter-offer
(Say) from the shareholder, the manager may be more cautious in deciding the amount of offer
because a large disparity in offer and counter-offer is undesirable. Fairness is more likely to have
an effect when an offer is compared to a counter-offer (Wang 2010). However, Say-only does
not provide a reason for lowering the offer because the counter-offer cannot be lower. In
contrast, Say-with-Clawback does provide a reason for avoiding overstatement because such
behavior will be punished. In other words, Clawback promotes honesty and fairness, and Say,
socially and psychologically, helps this process. These reasons suggest that the manager’s offer
is likely to be lower when the shareholder can make a counter-offer and there is a penalty for
dishonoring the offer, stated formally:
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H1a: Manager’s offer will be lower when the shareholder can make a counter-offer and
there is a penalty for dishonoring the offer than when there is no counter-offer option
and/or there is no penalty.
H1b: Manager’s offer will be closer to the stated fair amounts when shareholder can
make a counter-offer and there is a penalty for dishonoring the offer than when there is
no counter-offer option and/or there is no penalty.
Since the manager’s offer tends to be lower when the shareholder can make a counteroffer and there is a penalty for dishonoring the offer, given an option (as in the second and third
rounds of the game), the shareholder’s counter-offer is then more likely under this condition than
under the alternative conditions. This leads to the following prediction:
H2: Shareholder’s counter-offer in the second and third rounds of the game will be more
likely when there is a penalty for dishonoring the offer than when there is no such option.
Since a decent amount of return (the shareholder would not invest if the manager’s offer
is too low) is somewhat ensured (a 50% chance in this game) with Clawback, the shareholder is
more likely to invest under this condition. Say – making a counter-offer – will only, socially and
psychologically, perhaps also economically (particularly because the game has multiple rounds,
which creates a need for relationship), enhance the likelihood of return (Dickhaut et al. 2008).
These reasons lead to the following prediction:
H3a: Shareholder is more likely to invest with a counter-offer and when there is a penalty
for dishonoring the offer than when there is no counter-offer and/or there is no penalty.
H3b: Manager is likely to return more with a counter-offer and when there is a penalty
for dishonoring the offer than when there is no counter-offer and/or there is no penalty.
Additional analyses are conducted to the extent that the data allows. For example, the
amounts of return are compared with “fair” amounts of return provided by the managers and
shareholders. Comparisons are also made between the offered amounts and returned amounts
and differences between individual conditions are discussed at length.
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CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS
Participants
The purpose of this study was to experimentally investigate whether two major
provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act, say-on-pay and clawback of bonus compensation,
affected either shareholder trust or manager trustworthiness in an investment setting.

To

investigate these questions, we conducted five experimental sessions over a four-week period.
At the beginning of each experimental session, participants were randomly chosen to serve as
either manager or shareholder, maintaining that role for the duration of the experiment. After the
roles had been assigned, shareholder players moved to a different room where they were
randomly paired with an anonymous manager-counterpart. The identities of the respective
players were not revealed to their counterparts at any time during or after the experiment.
As discussed in Chapter 3, all participants completed a post-experiment questionnaire
which included a manipulation check to ensure that subjects could clearly identify the condition
to which they were assigned. Those participants who failed to correctly answer the manipulation
check questions were dropped from further analysis, resulting in a final sample of 35 managershareholder pairs. The total sample of subjects included 57 business majors and 13 non-business
majors, 42 of whom were female and 28 of whom were male. Demographic data for the 70
participants is presented in Table 1 below.

55

Table 1

Participant Demographics
Number of
Participants

%

Gender
Male
Female

28
42

40%
60%

Age
18 – 25
26 – 33
34 – 41

59
7
4

84%
10%
6%

Job Status
Employed
Not Employed

49
21

70%
30%

Major
Business
Non-Business

57
13

81%
19%

Variable

Treatment Groups
Recall that the four experimental conditions were: No Say-on-Pay with No Clawback
(NSNC), Say-on-Pay with No Clawback (WSNC), No Say-on-Pay with Clawback (NSWC), and
Say-on-Pay with Clawback (WSWC).

Descriptive statistics are presented for individual

treatment groups in Table 2. A preliminary analysis was conducted to determine whether
significant differences existed between treatment groups on categorical demographic variables.
Results of the chi-square analyses for demographic by treatment condition are presented in Table
3 - Panel A, indicating no significant relationship between demographic variables and treatment
condition. A similar summary in Table 3 – Panel B reveals no significant results for chi-square
analyses of demographic by role. It would appear that both treatment condition and role in the
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experiment (i.e. shareholder or manager) are independent of all demographic variables. Thus, we
can conclude that the randomization process was successful.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics: Demographics by Treatment Group
NSNC
NSWC
WSNC
WSWC
Number of Dyads
9
8
8
10
Number of Females
11
10
9
10
Number Employed
13
9
12
15
Age Group
18 – 25
17
12
13
17
26 – 33
1
2
2
2
34 – 41
0
2
1
1
Major
Business
13
16
12
16
Non-Business
5
0
4
4

Totals
35
40
49
59
7
4
57
13

Table 3 - Panel A

Chi Square Tests for Demographic by Condition
Variable
Test
Statistic
Df

Sig.

Gender

2

 

0.145

3

0.986

Age

2

3.302

6

0.812

Major

2



5.122

3

0.176

Job Status

2

1.911

3

0.617



Table 3 - Panel B

Chi Square Tests for Demographic by Role
Variable
Test
Statistic
Df
Gender
Age
Major
Job Status

2 
2
2
2

0.000
2.303
2.362
0.612
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1
2
1
1

Sig.
1.0
0.369
0.218
0.603

Aggregate Data
Some features of the aggregate data are presented in the Tables below. Table 4 shows the
relative frequencies of participants who chose to invest as well as the conditional relative
frequencies of “split” (given the choice to invest) by treatment and by individual round.
Frequency of split was calculated using only those participants who had an opportunity to split.
If their respective counterpart chose not to invest, there was no opportunity to split. In such
cases, each player received only their initial endowment. Recall that the same subjects played all
three rounds within each treatment group, so these are not independent observations. From a
cursory inspection, the percentages of investment in Table 5 are exactly as predicted, with
investment being least frequent in the control condition and most frequent in the with Say with
Clawback condition. In fact, looking at the data, without the benefit of statistical analysis, it
would appear that the threat of penalty (an economic variable) results in significantly more
investment than giving shareholders a say on pay (a psychological variable). The relative
frequency of investment and splitting is presented by treatment condition in Table 5 with the
highest efficiency for both in the Say with Clawback treatment condition.
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Table 4

Frequency of Investment and Splitting
Choice to Invest
Choice to Split
Conditional
Frequency
Percentage
Frequency
Percentage
No Say With No
Clawback
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
No Say With Clawback
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
With Say No Clawback
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
With Say With Clawback
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3

6
6
5

0.67
0.67
0.56

5
6
4

0.83
1.00
0.80

7
7
7

0.88
0.88
0.88

7
6
7

1.00
0.86
1.00

6
4
7

0.75
0.50
0.88

6
4
5

1.00
1.00
0.71

10
8
10

1.00
0.80
1.00

10
8
8

1.00
1.00
0.80

Table 5

Percentage of Investment and Splitting
NSNC

NSWC

WSNC

WSWC

Percentage of Investment*

63%

88%

71%

93%

Percentage of Splitting**

88%

95%

88%

93%

*Calculated based on 3 rounds of play
**Of those who had an opportunity to split

Average winnings for shareholders in all treatment conditions combined across all three
rounds of play were $5.33. Likewise, average winnings for managers in all conditions across all
rounds amounted to $8.96. Interestingly, as shown in Table 6, managers tended to mislead
shareholders (i.e. stated return was larger than actual return) less often in the “with say”
treatment conditions than in the “no say” conditions. As expected, the most effective deterrent to
manager misbehavior was the presence of a say on pay combined with the threat of economic
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penalty. Two of the treatment conditions did not provide for a penalty in the event of manager
misstatements. However, where the penalty was allowed, it was often enforced (50% of the time
in the No Say condition and 100% of the time in the With Say condition).

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics for Entire Data Set
Average Winnings
Within Each Round

Frequency
of
Penalty
Clawback
Enforced
NA
NA
NA

Shareholder
4.89
5.33
5.22

Manager
8.44
8.00
7.22

Frequency of
Misbehavior
Manager
Misled
2.00
3.00
3.00

5.15

7.89

30%

NA

5.75
5.50
5.00

9.25
9.50
10.00

2.00
2.00
4.00

1.00
2.00
1.00

5.42

9.58

33%

50%

5.63
5.13
4.13

8.38
6.88
10.88

1.00
1.00
3.00

NA
NA
NA

4.96

8.71

21%

NA

6.40
5.60
5.40

9.60
8.80
10.60

1.00
1.00
2.00

1.00
1.00
2.00

Average/Percentage
for WSWC Condition

5.80

9.67

13%

100%

Average for all
Conditions

5.33

8.96

NSNC
NSNC
NSNC

Round
1.00
2.00
3.00

Average/Percentage
for NSNC Condition
NSWC
NSWC
NSWC

1.00
2.00
3.00

Average/Percentage
for NSWC Condition
WSNC
WSNC
WSNC

1.00
2.00
3.00

Average/Percentage
for WSNC Condition
WSWC
WSWC
WSWC

1.00
2.00
3.00
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Hypothesis Testing
H1a - Manager Offers
Our first hypothesis predicts that Managers’ offers will be lower in the With Say with
Clawback treatment condition than in the other treatment conditions. To test whether manager
offers differ by treatment condition, an ANOVA was first conducted to assess the overall impact
of SAY and CLAW on mean manager offers9. The results indicated that the variables of interest
were not significant in Rounds 1 or 3. However, CLAWBACK did present a significant effect in
Round 2 (F=3.9, p=.057). Results of the Round 2 ANOVA are presented below in Table 7 along
with mean manager offers by round. Referring to this table, it is apparent that the biggest
difference in mean manager offers occurs between the WSWC condition and the control
condition with offers being a full $1.19 higher in the latter treatment.

Table 7

Mean Offer &
Mean
Difference
by Round
1

With
Say
With
Claw
6.10

Treatment Condition
With
No Say
Say
No Say
No
No
With
Claw
Claw
Claw
6.11
6.25
6.38
-0.01
-0.15
-0.28

2

5.70

6.89
-1.19

6.38
-0.68

5.63
0.07

3

7.30

7.78
-0.48

7.25
0.05

6.88
0.42

Round 2 ANOVA Results

Say
Claw
Say x
Claw

df
1
1

F
0.20
3.90

pvalue
0.658
0.057

1

0.36

0.553

Although the ANOVA for Round 2 does suggest that CLAWBACK influences manager
offers, it does not provide statistical evidence with respect to specific treatment conditions that

9

A similar analysis was conducted using repeated measures ANOVA. Results of that analysis, considering all three
rounds simultaneously, indicate that neither say (F = .063, p = .803) nor claw (F = .983, p = .329) was significant.
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the hypothesis addresses. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct planned post hoc comparisons
between manager offers under the WSWC condition and three other conditions. As indicated in
Table 8, the mean difference between manager offers in the WSWC and the NSNC condition is
statistically significant (t=1.76, p=.05). However, there is no similar result when WSWC is
compared to either SAY alone or CLAW alone. In other words, considering both Round 2
ANOVA results and the pairwise T-tests, presented below, the two groups that differ based on
the presence of a clawback are statistically different but the two groups that differ based on
shareholder say are not statistically different. This result suggests that with respect to manager
offers, the economic impact of a penalty has more influence than the psychological impact of
shareholder voice. This conclusion aside, H1a is only partially supported.

Table 8

Pairwise T-Tests of Manager Offers in Round 2

WSWC
NSNC
WSNC
NSWC

4
Vs. 1
Vs. 2
Vs. 3

Mean Offer
5.70
6.89
6.38
5.63

N
10

t

p-value

9
8
8

1.76
1.19
-0.114

.050
.130
.460

NSNC
WSNC
NSWC

1

6.89

9

Vs. 2
Vs. 3

6.38
5.63

8
8

0.688
1.55

.251
.071

H1b – Manager Offers With Respect to Fairness
All participants, regardless of treatment condition or role (i.e. manager or shareholder),
were asked to provide a statement regarding what they considered to be a fair return. The
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wording in these statements was slightly different depending upon shareholder investment, but
both statements, as presented to manager participants, appear in Appendix B as a part of the postexperiment questionnaire.

Presentation of “Stated Fair Return” for both shareholders and

managers by treatment condition is presented in Table 9.
Table 9

Stated Fair Return – NSNC
Pair ID
Shareholder
Manager
1
4
8
2
6
6
3
6
4
5
6
6
6
9
10
7
8
8
9
8
6
14
8
8
15
12
6
Average

7.44

Difference

0.56

6.89

Stated Fair Return – NSWC
Pair ID
Shareholder
Manager
2
8
6
5
6
6
6
8
8
7
6
6
8
8
5
11
5
5
14
8
6
15
8
6
Average

7.13

Difference

1.13

Stated Fair Return - WSWC
Pair ID
Shareholder
Manager
1
8
6
2
6
6
3
6
6
4
8
8
5
10
8
7
6
6
8
6
7
10
6
7
14
7
6
15
9
4

6.00

Average

7.20

Difference

0.80

6.40

Stated Fair Return - WSNC
Pair ID
Shareholder
Manager
1
8
6
2
8
8
3
8
8
4
6
6
5
6
4
8
8
8
10
6
6
14
7
6
Average

7.13

Difference

0.63

6.50

To test H1b, a “difference score” variable was needed to measure the difference between the
original offer of each manager and the stated fair amount given by that manager in each round of
play.

In other words, this variable was the difference between managers’ initial offers to

shareholders and what managers stated was a fair return.
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H1b predicted that managers’ offers would be closer to the stated fair amount in the Say
with Clawback condition than in the other three treatment conditions. Presented in Table 10Panel A are mean difference scores, by treatment group, for the three rounds of play. Negative
values indicate that the amount offered was less than the stated fair amount. With respect to
these values, the treatment condition with the lowest absolute value represents the treatment
condition where managers’ offers were closest to their assessment of what was fair. H1b
predicted that the lowest absolute value would be in the WSWC condition. Statistical results are
presented in Table 10-Panel B below.

Table 10-Panel A

Treatment Condition
Mean Difference
Between Offer
and Manager Fairness by
Round
1

With
Say
With
Claw
-0.30

No Say
No Claw
-0.78

With Say
No Claw
-0.25

No Say
With
Claw
0.38

2

-0.70

0.00

-0.12

-0.38

3

0.90

0.89

0.75

0.87

Table 10-Panel B

Round 1

ANOVA Results for Manager Difference Scores
Source
F
df
Say
1
0.026
Claw
1.434
Say x Claw
1.705

p-value
0.874
0.240
0.201

Round 2

Say
Claw
Say x Claw

1

0.224
0.997
0.044

0.640
0.326
0.835

Round 3

Say
Claw
Say x Claw

1

0.008
0.011
0.016

0.930
0.917
0.900
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An ANOVA was conducted to determine if there were significant group differences for
each round of play, across treatment conditions, between the amount of return offered by
managers and managers’ assessment of a fair offer. Table 10-Panel B summarizes these results.
Again, a comparison is being made between the difference score in the WSWC treatment
condition with the other three conditions. The difference variable is not significant in any of the
three rounds based on treatment condition. Thus, H1b is not supported.
In general, for Rounds 1 and 2, managers made an initial offer that was lower than what
they considered to be fair (denoted by negative difference scores). However, in Round 3,
difference scores were higher, suggesting that offers were higher than was considered fair. This
finding is consistent with prior findings on reputation effects in that, for the final round of play,
managers are no longer concerned with shareholder perception which might affect investment in
future rounds. Consequently, in Round 3, managers are more likely to behave in a self-interested
fashion by offering more and returning less to shareholders.

Further examination of the

“fairness” aspects of shareholder and manager behavior will be addressed in a subsequent
section.

H2 – Counteroffer More Likely with Clawback
Recall, H2 predicts shareholders’ counteroffer in the second and third rounds of the game
will be more likely when there is a penalty for dishonoring the offer. To test this hypothesis, it
was necessary to limit the data to include only observations where SAY (i.e. counteroffer) was
permitted because we are interested in whether the frequency of SAY is statistically different in
the CLAW vs. NO CLAW conditions. It was also necessary to exclude all Round 1 observations
because SAY was mandatory in Round 1 and optional in Rounds 2 and 3, thus, there would be
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no variation in counteroffer for Round 1. Chi Square analysis using the data from Rounds 2 and
3 of the WSNC and the WSWC treatment conditions suggests that the presence of a penalty does
not impact the exercise of a SAY with respect to return. Round 2 results are 2 = 1.90, p = .184,
(df=1, N=18) and Round 3 results are 2 = .064, p = .618, (df=1, N=18).
Referring to the frequency table below (Table 11), a non-statistical analysis of the pattern
of counteroffer vs. no counteroffer in Round 2 suggests that there is a difference in the way
shareholders respond to the presence of a potential manager penalty. It would appear that
shareholders in the WSWC condition are more likely to express a say, although this conclusion is
not supported statistically. In Round 3, even though the pattern of counteroffer is much more
consistent between the two treatments, there is still a slightly greater preference for counteroffer
in the WSWC group. Although the statistical results described above are somewhat counterintuitive, supplemental power analysis suggests that a larger sample size would have produced
significant results in favor of H2. Consequently, these results warrant future consideration.

Table 11

Percentage (Frequency) of Shareholders Exercising "Say"
Say Only Group

WSWC Group

Round 2

Round 3

Round 2

Round 3

Shareholder Made
Counter Offer

38% (3)

75% (6)

70% (7)

80% (8)

Shareholder Did Not
Make Counter Offer

62% (5)

25% (2)

30% (3)

20% (2)
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H3a – Shareholder Investment
A particularly important policy issue addressed in this study is whether shareholder
behavior is directly influenced by either having a say in the executive compensation process or
being protected from manager misbehavior through the imposition of a penalty to clawback illgotten manager bonuses. In other words, will shareholders actually be motivated to invest in
U.S. capital markets as a result of the Dodd-Frank legislation. H3a predicts that shareholders are
more likely to invest with a counter-offer and when there is a penalty for dishonoring the offer
than when there is no counter-offer and/or there is no penalty.

This hypothesis requires

comparison of the WSWC group to the other three treatment conditions. The results of these
comparisons are summarized in Table 12 below. Chi Square tests were conducted first for each
individual round of play, with all four treatment conditions considered, to determine whether the
treatment conditions were significantly different from each other and then pairwise comparisons
were made to examine the differences between the WSWC treatment condition and the other
three treatment groups.
Table 12

Chi Square Tests for Frequency of Investment
Statistic
Value
2
Overall Chi Square on Round 1
 
4.19
2
WSWC to NSNC
 
3.96
WSWC to WSNC
2 
2.81
2
WSWC to NSWC
1.32
 

2
Overall Chi Square on Round 2
3.27
 
2
WSWC to NSNC
 
0.43
2
WSWC to WSNC
 
1.80
WSWC to NSWC
2 
0.18

Overall Chi Square on Round 3
2 
7.04
2
WSWC to NSNC
5.63
 
2
WSWC to WSNC
 
1.32
2
WSWC to NSWC
 
1.32
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Df
3
1
1
1

p-value
0.24
0.05*
0.09**
0.25

3
1
1
1

0.35
0.51
0.18
0.67

3
1
1
1

0.07**
0.02*
0.25
0.25

* p < .05
**p < .10




As indicated in Table 12, there is a statistically significant overall difference among the
four treatment conditions only in Round 3 (p =.07). This evidence suggests that shareholders do,
in fact, exhibit some change in behavior with respect to investment which can be attributed to the
manipulations. However, this overall significant result does not tell us which treatment groups
are driving this difference. Therefore, supplemental chi square analysis was conducted to make
pairwise comparisons, by round, between the WSWC condition and the other three treatment
conditions. Again, referring to Table 12, we can see that significant differences exist in Round 1
between the control condition and the WSWC condition as well as between the “say only”
condition and the WSWC condition. Careful analysis of these Round 1 results suggests that the
difference in investment occurred because of the clawback rather than the say on pay. Notice
that there is no statistical difference between the WSWC condition and the NSWC condition.
This finding essentially verifies that if we hold claw constant, there is no significant change in
frequency of investment as a result of shareholders having a say on pay. Further evidence to
support the impact of the clawback on shareholder investment can be found by analyzing the
result of the WSWC to the WSNC comparison in Round 1. Notice that both of these treatment
conditions allow shareholders to express an opinion regarding return. The only difference
between these two treatments is the presence of a clawback, yet, 93% of the shareholders in the
WSWC condition invested as compared to only 71% in the WSNC condition.
In Round 3 of play, we observe both a marginal overall significance (p = .07) and a
strong significance (p = .02) in the impact of treatment group on investment at the two
experimental extremes, the control condition and the condition with both say and claw. With
respect to Round 2, the data does not provide evidence that treatment condition is associated with
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significantly different frequencies of investment. Again, supplemental power analysis suggests
that increased sample size would improve the strength of these results. However, we cannot say
definitively from the results in Rounds 2 or 3 whether the presence of a potential penalty is the
deciding factor for shareholders in their decisions to invest but we can say that the results from
Round 1 would support that theory.
It would appear that the policy provisions contained within the Dodd Frank legislation do
influence shareholder behavior when taken together but we cannot make assumptions at this time
as to which provision, if either, predicts shareholder investment.

Referring to Table 4,

investment in the WSWC condition was at 100% in the first and last rounds and remained strong
in Round 2 at 80%. Investment in the NSWC condition was also very strong with investment
remaining consistently at 88% throughout all three rounds of play. In terms of percentage of
investment, shareholders in these two conditions, the WSWC condition and the NSWC
condition, appear to be most likely to invest. Supplemental power analysis suggests that an
increased sample size would support a stronger conclusion for the significance of clawback as a
driver of shareholder investment.

H3b – Manager Return
The final hypothesis in the study (H3b) predicts that managers will return more in the Say
with Clawback condition than in the other three treatment conditions. Testing this hypothesis
requires an examination of shareholder return for each of the individual treatment conditions. A
summary of the average amounts returned by managers is presented in Table 13, followed in
Table 14 by a statistical comparison of mean manager return between treatment conditions for
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the three rounds of play10.

10

Generally, statistical results of t-tests are reported in the form of a two-tailed p-value, meaning that at alpha = .05,
statistical significance would be indicated by a test statistic which lies in either the upper 2.5% or the lower 2.5% of
the underlying probability distribution. However, the question of interest in the present study is whether mean
manager return is greater (not lesser) in the WSWC condition. Because of the nature of this directional hypothesis,
it is appropriate to report significance using a one-tailed test. We use this convention where appropriate throughout
the remainder of the paper.
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Table 13

Average Amounts Returned by Managers Across
Conditions
N
MEAN
S.D.
NSNC
Round 1
9
4.89
2.26
Round 2
9
5.33
1.73
Round 3
9
5.22
3.07
Overall Trmt Mean
5.15
WSNC
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Overall Trmt Mean

8
8
8

5.62
5.13
4.13
4.96

1.51
1.46
2.85

NSWC
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Overall Trmt Mean

8
8
8

5.75
5.50
5.00
5.42

1.58
2.93
1.93

WSWC
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Overall Trmt Mean

10
10
10

6.40
5.60
5.40
5.80

1.08
1.43
3.06

As predicted in H3b, the average amount returned to shareholders was highest in the WSWC
condition with an overall mean across the three rounds of $5.80. The next highest overall
treatment mean was in the NSWC treatment condition with a mean return of $5.42. However,
analysis of the data using t-tests suggests that these differences are not statistically significant.
Referring to Table 14, the only significant difference in manager return occurred between the
control condition and the WSWC condition in Round 1 with no significance in Rounds 2 or 3.
Even though the predicted differences are not statistically significant, observed negative t-values
for every comparison of mean return in Table 14 indicate that H3b is directionally correct.
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Shareholders did receive greater absolute returns in the WSWC condition than in any other
condition
Table 14

T-Tests for Amounts Returned by Managers
Across Treatments

Round 1

Game 4
v.1
v.2
v.3

t-stat
-1.83
-1.23
-0.99

p-value
(1-sided)
0.047*
0.121
0.170

Round 2

Game 4
v.1
v.2
v.3

-0.36
-0.69
-0.09

0.721
0.499
0.930

Game 4
v.1
v.2
v.3

-0.13
-0.91
-0.34

0.901
0.376
0.740

Round 3

Additional Analysis – Perception of Fairness
Additional tests were performed to investigate how manager offers compared to
shareholders’ assessment of what represented a fair return. The results reveal interesting but
unsurprising patterns. Offers are less than what shareholders consider to be fair in every
treatment condition in both Rounds 1 and 2. However, in Round 3, this is not the case.
Consistent with prior literature, managers offer more in the final round of play resulting in less of
a difference between that amount and shareholders’ assessment of fairness.
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Table 15

Difference Between Manager Offers and Shareholders' Assessment of Fair Return
Shareholder
Manager Offer
Fairness
Results
p-value
Mean
(oneRound 1
N
Mean
N
Mean
Difference
t
sided)
NSNC
9
6.11
9
7.44
-1.33
-1.47
0.082**
WSNC
8
6.25
8
7.13
-0.88
-1.62
0.065**
NSWC
8
6.38
8
7.13
-0.75
-1.23
0.119
WSWC 10
6.10
10
7.20
-1.10
-1.78
0.046*
Round 2
NSNC
WSNC
NSWC
WSWC

9
8
8
10

6.89
6.38
5.63
5.70

9
8
8
10

7.44
7.13
7.13
7.20

-0.55
-0.75
-1.50
-1.50

-0.58
-1.30
-2.09
-2.61

0.287
0.109
0.028*
0.009*

Round 3
NSNC
WSNC
NSWC
WSWC

9
8
8
10

7.78
7.25
6.88
7.30

9
8
8
10

7.44
7.13
7.13
7.20

0.34
0.12
-0.25
0.10

0.32
0.14
-0.28
0.13

0.375
0.446
0.394
0.450

An examination of the difference between actual return and managers’ assessment of a
fair return is presented in Table 16. One interesting finding revealed by this analysis is the fact
that actual return is less than what managers considered to be a fair return for every round in
every treatment condition with the exception of one “zero” difference in the WSWC treatment
condition in Round 1. Analysis using t-tests confirm that the NSNC condition presents a
significant difference between actual and fair return in every round of play (t = -2.09, p = .027; t
= -1.89, p = .039, t = -1.41, p = .091). This finding suggests that managers knowingly gave an
unfairly low return when they were not deterred from doing so by either shareholder input or a
potential economic penalty. The WSNC condition suggests a similar result with significant
findings in Rounds 2 and 3 (t = -1.91, p = .038; t = -2.11, p = .030) and nearly so in Round 1 (t =
-1.20; p = .126). An inconclusive exception to this finding occurred in the WSWC condition in
Round 2 which presented a significant finding (t = -1.37, p = .094).
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Table 16

Difference Between Actual Return and Managers' Assessment of Fair Return
Actual Return
Manager Fairness
Results

t
-2.09
-1.20
-0.39
0.00

p-value
(onesided)
0.027*
0.126
0.353
0.500

Round 1
NSNC
WSNC
NSWC
WSWC

N
9
8
8
10

Mean
4.89
5.63
5.75
6.40

N
9
8
8
10

Mean
6.89
6.50
6.00
6.40

Mean
Difference
-2.00
-0.87
-0.25
0.00

Round 2
NSNC
WSNC
NSWC
WSWC

9
8
8
10

5.33
5.13
5.50
5.60

9
8
8
10

6.89
6.50
6.00
6.40

-1.56
-1.37
-0.50
-0.80

-1.89
-1.91
-0.46
-1.37

0.039*
0.038*
0.328
0.094**

Round 3
NSNC
WSNC
NSWC
WSWC

9
8
8
10

5.22
4.13
5.00
5.40

9
8
8
10

6.89
6.50
6.00
6.40

-1.67
-2.37
-1.00
-1.00

-1.41
-2.11
-1.32
-0.96

0.091**
0.030*
0.108
0.178

A summary of the differences between actual return and shareholder perception of a fair
return, presented in Table 17, reveal significant statistical evidence (with one exception in the
WSWC condition of Round 1, (t=-1.21, p = .259)) in every round of play, for each of the four
treatments, that what managers actually returned was drastically different from what
shareholders considered to be fair. In this instance it is also informative to examine the mean
difference between actual and anticipated return. Mean difference in the two conditions where a
potential penalty is present for each of the three rounds of play is smaller than the mean
differences in the two conditions which do not contain a clawback provision. From this evidence
we can conclude that even though there were significant differences between what managers
actually returned and what shareholders thought was fair, the clawback generally worked to
mitigate this contrast.
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Table 17

Difference Between Actual Return and Shareholders' Assessment of Fair Return
Shareholder
Actual Return
Fairness
Results
p-value
Mean
(oneRound 1
N
Mean
N
Mean
Difference
t
sided)
NSNC
9
4.89
9
7.44
-2.55
-2.10
0.035*
WSNC
8
5.63
8
7.13
-1.50
-2.39
0.024*
NSWC
8
5.75
8
7.13
-1.38
-2.43
0.045*
WSWC
10
6.40
10
7.20
-0.80
-1.21
0.259
Round 2
NSNC
WSNC
NSWC
WSWC

9
8
8
10

5.33
5.13
5.50
5.60

9
8
8
10

7.44
7.13
7.13
7.20

-2.11
-2.00
-1.63
-1.60

-2.04
-3.53
-1.55
-1.86

0.038*
0.005*
0.083**
0.048*

Round 3
NSNC
WSNC
NSWC
WSWC

9
8
8
10

5.22
4.13
5.00
5.40

9
8
8
10

7.44
7.13
7.13
7.20

-2.22
-3.00
-2.13
-1.80

-2.06
-2.95
-2.55
-1.65

0.037*
0.01*
0.019*
0.067**

In the two “say” conditions, WSNC and WSWC, shareholders were given the opportunity
to express a counteroffer at the time of investment. Counteroffer was mandatory in Round 1 and
voluntary in Rounds 2 and 3.

Table 18 presents a summary of the average amount of

counteroffer compared to what the shareholder thought was a fair return. An observation of
these means suggests that the counteroffer was closer to the shareholder’s perception of fair
when a potential penalty for manager misbehavior was present. A plausible explanation for this
behavior could be that shareholders’ were more confident that their counteroffer would be
considered if managers faced a penalty for misleading.
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Table 18

Counteroffer vs. Shareholders' Assessment of Fair Return
Shareholder
Counteroffer
Fairness
Round 1
N
Mean
N
Mean
Mean Diff
WSNC
8
5.38
8
7.13
-1.75
WSWC
10
6.40
10
7.20
-0.80
Round 2
WSNC
WSWC

7
7

3.00
7.86

8
10

7.13
7.20

-4.13
0.66

Round 3
WSNC
WSWC

8
9

5.75
7.22

8
10

7.13
7.20

-1.38
0.02

Once again, counteroffer was mandatory in Round 1 and voluntary in Rounds 2 and 3 of
the WSNC and the WSWC conditions. Table 19 presents a summary of the average amount of
counteroffer compared to what the managers thought was a fair return. Analysis of this data
provides further evidence that the clawback provides some incentive for shareholders to make a
counteroffer and managers are more reasonable in their assessments of fair where a potential
penalty exists. In the WSWC condition for Round 1, there is no difference in manager or
shareholder perception of fairness and in Rounds 2 and 3, counteroffers were closer to the
managers’ perception of fair when a potential penalty for manager misbehavior was present.
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Table 19

Counteroffer vs. Managers' Assessment of Fair Return
Counteroffer
Manager Fairness
Round 1
N
Mean
N
Mean
Mean Diff
WSNC
8
5.38
8
6.50
-1.12
WSWC
10
6.40
10
6.40
0.00
Round 2
WSNC
WSWC

7
7

3.00
7.86

8
10

6.50
6.40

-3.50
1.46

Round 3
WSNC
WSWC

8
9

5.75
7.22

8
10

6.50
6.40

-0.75
0.82
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION
This study is an investigation of the impact of two recently mandated shareholder
protections, say on pay and clawbacks of executive compensation, implemented as a result of the
Dodd Frank legislation. Say-on-pay is a psychological incentive intended to give shareholders a
voice in the governance process and thereby cause them to feel vested in both the investment
decision and the financial outcome.

Clawbacks, on the other hand, are an economic dis-

incentive intended to discourage managers from manipulating accounting information to achieve
self-interested outcomes. The two control mechanisms have been independently investigated in
several academic studies, most often using archival data. However, the current study is unique in
that it is the first to investigate both say on pay and clawbacks of executive compensation with
respect to shareholder trust and manager trustworthiness.
This study provides evidence in support of the following findings. First, shareholders are
more likely to participate in the investment process if they feel they have a voice in that process
AND are comfortable that managers can be trusted to act responsibly.

Investment occurred

more frequently (91% overall) when managers were subject to a potential penalty for
misbehavior. When no such penalty existed, investment dropped to 67% overall.

Likewise,

managers were more likely to be trustworthy (i.e. return something to shareholders) a higher
percentage of the time when the clawback was in place, roughly 94% of the time in the penalty
condition compared to 88% of the time when no penalty existed. As in prior trust game studies,
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managers fared better overall than shareholders with average winnings of $8.96 compared to
$5.33.
Second, manager offers are lower when they are faced with a penalty for misreporting.
Analysis of the four treatment conditions revealed a statistical difference between manager offers
in the control condition and the penalty condition (mean of $6.89 in the control condition
compared to mean of $5.63 in the penalty condition). This finding suggests that the policy
requiring a penalty for financial restatements is a strong incentive for managers to be
conservative in their reporting of financial data.
Third, managers did not make offers which were significantly different from what they
thought was fair. However, ACTUAL RETURN was, in general, statistically lower than what
either managers or shareholders considered to be a fair return. With respect to managers, the
statistical differences between return and shareholder fairness were particularly striking in the
“no-penalty” conditions whereas, for shareholders, the difference between actual and fair return
was statistically significant regardless of treatment condition. However, the evidence does
suggest that the clawback mitigates this inequity to some extent. Also, manager offers were
generally higher in the third and final round of play, consistent with the notion that in the final
round of play, managers are no longer concerned with the need to appear trustworthy for the
purpose of inducing investment in future rounds.

Limitations and Potential Future Research
There are several limitations to this study that could be addressed with future research.
First, failed manipulation check questions resulted in the loss of approximately 25% of the
subjects who originally participated in the experiment. This reduction in sample size caused a
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loss of power as well as unequal distribution of observations across treatment conditions.
Although the findings reported herein are robust and consistent with theory, subsequent power
analysis suggests that a larger sample size would provide stronger evidence to substantiate the
main predictions put forth. Therefore, caution should be used when generalizing these results to
a larger population.
Second, this study is based on a game theoretical approach used to explore the complex
psychological states of trust and trustworthiness. Researchers have long debated the virtues of
laboratory research over field research and although our study lacks contextual detail, it is
grounded in sound experimental economics theory. As noted by Kachelmeier and King (2002),
only in a true experiment can we vary an existing or proposed policy alternative of interest and
measure its incremental influence on decision makers, holding all other influences constant. The
findings reported in this study contribute in a meaningful way to the debate surrounding
currently mandated shareholder protections.

A future experimental study could compare the

results of this study with one which provides a much greater level of contextual detail. It would
appear that in at least some settings, the clarifications implied by contextual descriptions can
indeed modify the economic predictions that would otherwise prevail (Haynes and Kachelmeier,
1998).
The Dodd Frank legislation continues to be a controversial, expensive, and, perhaps,
ineffective regulatory measure. It was passed as a result of failing financial markets and public
outrage over abusive corporate compensation practices that rewarded managers without regard
for performance.

The law was intended to make the process of structuring executive

compensation more transparent while holding managers to a higher standard of accountability to
both shareholders and the public. However, the cost of implementation and the complexity of
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the legislation itself have perpetuated discord between regulators and companies. On June 21 st
of this year, State National Bank filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau claiming that it was neither accountable nor transparent in its
dealings.
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Note to researchers: Be sure to read the general instructions that you always read before a game
(see below). Player 1 and Player 2 should be separated in two rooms/locations before you begin this
game. The risk of collusion in the holding room is greater in this game due to the tripling effect. First
instruct the Player 2’s in a group. Then take up all of their statements to present to Player 1’s. Ask
them to wait while you play with the Player 1’s. Then ask the Player 1’s to wait while you play with
the Player 2’s in turn. Finally, pay off each group. Remember that there is no show-up fee with the
trust game because both sides are given the same initial endowment.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for taking the time to come today. Before we begin I want to make some general
comments about what we are doing here today and explain some rules that we need to follow. We
will be playing a game for real money that you will take home.
If you have heard about a game that has been played here in the past you should try to forget
everything that you have been told. This is a completely different game. We are about to begin the
game. It is important that you listen as carefully as possible, because only people who understand the
game will actually be able to play it. Please do not talk during the game instruction or during the
game itself. It is very important for you to obey this rule – even some inadvertent comments could
invalidate this study, in which case we would not be able to play the game today.
GAME INSTRUCTIONS (NO SAY NO CLAW)

Game Summary
You will play three rounds of the same investment game. This game is played by pairs of
individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. You will be assigned to the same
player type (either Player 1 or Player 2) and will be paired with the same partner for all three
rounds. Player 1 and Player 2 will each receive $4 cash vouchers to start the game. Player 1
will choose whether to keep his/her cash voucher or to invest it with Player 2. If Player 1 invests
the cash with Player 2, the investment will be tripled to $12. Player 2 will then choose how much
of that money ($12), if any, to return to Player 1.
Procedure
The game will be completed in the following steps:
1. Each player receives a cash voucher envelope containing a $4 cash voucher. Player 2
will also receive an Investment Return Form A.
2. On the Investment Return Form A, Player 2 enters a proposed amount (up to $12) that
s/he will return to Player 1 if Player 1 will invest his/her $4. However, Player 2 will not
be bound to his/her proposal.
3. Player 2 submits the Investment Return Form A to the experimenter, who forwards it to
Player 1.
4. Player 1 reviews the Investment Return Form A and then chooses whether to invest the
$4 or to keep it.
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5. If Player 1 decides to invest, Player 1 will leave the cash vouchers in the envelope.
6. Player 1 hands the $4 investment and the Investment Return Form A to the experimenter,
who triples the investment amount to $12 and forwards it with the Investment Return
Form A to Player 2.
7. Player 2 chooses the amount to return to Player 1 on the investment return form B and
hands it to the experimenter.
Payoff Calculation:
For Player 1:
Player 1 will be paid $4 if the cash voucher is not invested with Player 2. If the cash voucher was
invested with Player 2, then Player 1 will be paid for the amount that Player 2 returns to Player 1.
For Player 2:
Player 2 will be paid the original $4, plus the amount (up to $12) not returned to Player 1.

Cash Payment:
Each participant will be paid the highest amount she or he earned for one of three rounds of the
game played.
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Note to researchers: Be sure to read the general instructions that you always read before a game
(see below). Player 1 and Player 2 should be separated in two rooms/locations before you begin this
game. The risk of collusion in the holding room is greater in this game due to the tripling effect. First
instruct the Player 2’s in a group. Then take up all of their statements to present to Player 1’s. Ask
them to wait while you play with the Player 1’s. Then ask the Player 1’s to wait while you play with
the Player 2’s in turn. Finally, pay off each group. Remember that there is no show-up fee with the
trust game because both sides are given the same initial endowment.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for taking the time to come today. Before we begin I want to make some general
comments about what we are doing here today and explain some rules that we need to follow. We
will be playing a game for real money that you will take home.
If you have heard about a game that has been played here in the past you should try to forget
everything that you have been told. This is a completely different game. We are about to begin the
game. It is important that you listen as carefully as possible, because only people who understand the
game will actually be able to play it. Please do not talk during the game instruction or during the
game itself. It is very important for you to obey this rule – even some inadvertent comments could
invalidate this study, in which case we would not be able to play the game today.
GAME INSTRUCTIONS (SAY ONLY)

Game Summary
You will play three rounds of the same investment game. This game is played by pairs of
individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. You will be assigned to the same
player type (either Player 1 or Player 2) and will be paired with the same partner for all three
rounds. Player 1 and Player 2 will each receive $4 cash vouchers to start the game. Player 1
will choose whether to keep his/her cash voucher or to invest it with Player 2. If Player 1 invests
the cash with Player 2, the investment will be tripled to $12. Player 2 will then choose how much
of that money ($12), if any, to return to Player 1.
Procedure
The game will be completed in the following steps:
1. Each player receives a cash voucher envelope containing a $4 cash voucher.
Player
2 will also receive an Investment Return Form A.
2. On the Investment Return Form A, Player 2 enters a proposed amount (up to $12) that
s/he will return to Player 1 if Player 1 will invest his/her $4. However,
Player 2 will
not be bound to his/her proposal.
3. Player 2 submits the Investment Return Form A to the experimenter, who forwards it to
Player 1.
4. Player 1 reviews the Investment Return Form A and then chooses whether to
invest
the $4 or to keep it.
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5. If Player 1 decides to invest, Player 1 will leave the cash vouchers in the envelope, and
in the first round of the game (optional for the second and third
round), Player 1 also
must do the following: On the Investment Return Form A,
enter a counter-proposal of
the amount of cash (up to $12) to be returned to him/her. This amount may be equal to, more
than or less than the amount
proposed by Player 2.
6. Player 1 hands the $4 investment and the Investment Return Form A to the
experimenter, who triples the investment amount to $12 and forwards it with the
Investment Return Form A to Player 2.
7. Player 2 chooses the amount to return to Player 1 on the investment return form B
and hands it to the experimenter.
Payoff Calculation:
For Player 1:
Player 1 will be paid $4 if the cash voucher is not invested with Player 2. If the cash voucher was
invested with Player 2, then Player 1 will be paid for the amount that Player 2 returns to Player 1.
For Player 2:
Player 2 will be paid the original $4, plus the amount (up to $12) not returned to Player 1.

Cash Payment:
Each participant will be paid the highest amount she or he earned for one of three rounds of the
game played.
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Note to researchers: Be sure to read the general instructions that you always read before a game
(see below). Player 1 and Player 2 should be separated in two rooms/locations before you begin this
game. The risk of collusion in the holding room is greater in this game due to the tripling effect. First
instruct the Player 2’s in a group. Then take up all of their statements to present to Player 1’s. Ask
them to wait while you play with the Player 1’s. Then ask the Player 1’s to wait while you play with
the Player 2’s in turn. Finally, pay off each group. Remember that there is no show-up fee with the
trust game because both sides are given the same initial endowment.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for taking the time to come today. Before we begin I want to make some general
comments about what we are doing here today and explain some rules that we need to follow. We
will be playing a game for real money that you will take home.
If you have heard about a game that has been played here in the past you should try to forget
everything that you have been told. This is a completely different game. We are about to begin the
game. It is important that you listen as carefully as possible, because only people who understand the
game will actually be able to play it. Please do not talk during the game instruction or during the
game itself. It is very important for you to obey this rule – even some inadvertent comments could
invalidate this study, in which case we would not be able to play the game today.
GAME INSTRUCTIONS (CLAW ONLY)

Game Summary
You will play three rounds of the same investment game. This game is played by pairs of
individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. You will be assigned to the same
player type (either Player 1 or Player 2) and will be paired with the same partner for all three
rounds. Player 1 and Player 2 will each receive $4 cash vouchers to start the game. Player 1
will choose whether to keep his/her cash voucher or to invest it with Player 2. If Player 1 invests
the cash with Player 2, the investment will be tripled to $12. Player 2 will then choose how much
of that money ($12), if any, to return to Player 1.
Procedure
The game will be completed in the following steps:
1. Each player receives a cash voucher envelope containing a $4 cash voucher.
Player
2 will also receive an Investment Return Form A.
2. On the Investment Return Form A, Player 2 enters a proposed amount (up to $12) that
s/he will return to Player 1 if Player 1 will invest his/her $4. However,
Player 2 will
not be bound to his/her proposal.
3. Player 2 submits the Investment Return Form A to the experimenter, who forwards it to
Player 1.
4. Player 1 reviews the Investment Return Form A and then chooses whether to
invest
the $4 or to keep it.
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5. If Player 1 decides to invest, Player 1 will leave the cash vouchers in the envelope.
6. Player 1 hands the $4 investment and the Investment Return Form A to the
experimenter, who triples the investment amount to $12 and forwards it with the
Investment Return Form A to Player 2.
7. Player 2 chooses the amount to return to Player 1 on the investment return form B
and hands it to the experimenter.
Payoff Calculation:
For Player 1:
Player 1 will be paid $4 if the cash voucher is not invested with Player 2. If the cash voucher was
invested with Player 2, then Player 1 will be paid for the amount that Player 2 returns to Player 1,
except: In cases where Player 2 does not return at least his/her proposed amount on the Investment
Return Form A, there is a 50% chance that Player 2 will be required to return the entire $12 to
Player 1.
For Player 2:
Player 2 will be paid the original $4, plus the amount (up to $12) not returned to Player 1, except: In
cases where Player 2 does not return at least his/her proposed amount on the Investment Return
Form A, there is a 50% chance that Player 2 will be required to return the entire $12 to Player 1.

Cash Payment:
Each participant will be paid the highest amount she or he earned for one of three rounds of the
game played.
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Note to researchers: Be sure to read the general instructions that you always read before a game
(see below). Player 1 and Player 2 should be separated in two rooms/locations before you begin this
game. The risk of collusion in the holding room is greater in this game due to the tripling effect. First
instruct the Player 2’s in a group. Then take up all of their statements to present to Player 1’s. Ask
them to wait while you play with the Player 1’s. Then ask the Player 1’s to wait while you play with
the Player 2’s in turn. Finally, pay off each group. Remember that there is no show-up fee with the
trust game because both sides are given the same initial endowment.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for taking the time to come today. Before we begin I want to make some general
comments about what we are doing here today and explain some rules that we need to follow. We
will be playing a game for real money that you will take home.
If you have heard about a game that has been played here in the past you should try to forget
everything that you have been told. This is a completely different game. We are about to begin the
game. It is important that you listen as carefully as possible, because only people who understand the
game will actually be able to play it. Please do not talk during the game instruction or during the
game itself. It is very important for you to obey this rule – even some inadvertent comments could
invalidate this study, in which case we would not be able to play the game today.
GAME INSTRUCTIONS (SAY WITH CLAW)

Game Summary
You will play three rounds of the same investment game. This game is played by pairs of
individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. You will be assigned to the same
player type (either Player 1 or Player 2) and will be paired with the same partner for all three
rounds. Player 1 and Player 2 will each receive $4 cash vouchers to start the game. Player 1
will choose whether to keep his/her cash voucher or to invest it with Player 2. If Player 1 invests
the cash with Player 2, the investment will be tripled to $12. Player 2 will then choose how much
of that money ($12), if any, to return to Player 1.
Procedure
The game will be completed in the following steps:
1. Each player receives a cash voucher envelope containing a $4 cash voucher.
Player
2 will also receive an Investment Return Form A.
2. On the Investment Return Form A, Player 2 enters a proposed amount (up to $12) that
s/he will return to Player 1 if Player 1 will invest his/her $4. However,
Player 2 will
not be bound to his/her proposal.
3. Player 2 submits the Investment Return Form A to the experimenter, who forwards it to
Player 1.
4. Player 1 reviews the Investment Return Form A and then chooses whether to
invest
the $4 or to keep it.
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5. If Player 1 decides to invest, Player 1 will leave the cash vouchers in the envelope, and
in the first round of the game (optional for the second and third
round), Player 1 also
must do the following: On the Investment Return Form A,
enter a counter-proposal of
the amount of cash (up to $12) to be returned to him/her. This amount may be equal to, more
than or less than the amount
proposed by Player 2.
6. Player 1 hands the $4 investment and the Investment Return Form A to the
experimenter, who triples the investment amount to $12 and forwards it with the
Investment Return Form A to Player 2.
7. Player 2 chooses the amount to return to Player 1 on the investment return form B
and hands it to the experimenter.
Payoff Calculation:
For Player 1:
Player 1 will be paid $4 if the cash voucher is not invested with Player 2. If the cash voucher was
invested with Player 2, then Player 1 will be paid for the amount that Player 2 returns to Player 1,
except: In cases where Player 2 does not return at least his/her proposed amount on the Investment
Return Form A, there is a 50% chance that Player 2 will be required to return the entire $12 to
Player 1.
For Player 2:
Player 2 will be paid the original $4, plus the amount (up to $12) not returned to Player 1, except: In
cases where Player 2 does not return at least his/her proposed amount on the Investment Return
Form A, there is a 50% chance that Player 2 will be required to return the entire $12 to Player 1.

Cash Payment:
Each participant will be paid the highest amount she or he earned for one of three rounds of the
game played.
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Appendix B – Data Collection Forms
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Your ID #_________________________
Post-Experiment Questionnaire – No Investment - Player 1
Please take a few moments to answer the following questions. Your thoughtful responses will be
greatly appreciated and will help us to most accurately interpret the data we collected in today’s
experiment.
I.

You chose not to give money to Player 2. Please answer the following questions:
a. How much do you think Player 2 would have given back to you?____________________
b. How much do you think is fair for Player 2 to give back?____________________

II.

Please answer the following questions by placing an “X” in the appropriate blank:

Gender:

Male__________

Do you have a job?

Female__________

Yes________

No________

If you DO have a job Part-Time_________ Full-Time________
Do you have another source of income? _____Yes

_____No

Level of Income:

Greater than $50,000______

Age:

Less than $50,000______

18 – 25______

Major in college:

26 – 33______

34 – 41______

42 or Older______

Business__________ Non-Business__________

III.
Which of the following statements best describes the rules under which the game took
place in today’s experiment? (check all that apply)
(1)
_______You had an opportunity to tell Player 2 how much money you wanted
returned to you.

to have

(2)
_______Had you invested, you would have had a 50% chance of receiving your entire
investment back if Player 2 did not give back at least the stated amount of return.
(3)

_______Neither of the above statements applied to your experiment.
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Your ID #_________________________
Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Investment – Player 1
Please take a few moments to answer the following questions. Your thoughtful responses will be
greatly appreciated and will help us to most accurately interpret the data we collected in today’s
experiment.
I.

You chose to give money to Player 2. Please answer the following questions:
c. How much do you think Player 2 will give back to you?____________________
d. How much do you think is fair for Player 2 to give back?____________________

II.

Please answer the following questions by placing an “X” in the appropriate blank:

Gender:

Male__________

Do you have a job?

Female__________

Yes________

No________

If you DO have a job Part-Time_________ Full-Time________
Do you have another source of income? _____Yes

_____No

Level of Income:

Greater than $50,000______

Age:

Less than $50,000______

18 – 25______

Major in college:

26 – 33______

34 – 41______

42 or Older______

Business__________ Non-Business__________

III.
Which of the following statements best describes the rules under which the game took
place in today’s experiment? (check all that apply)
(1)
_______You had an opportunity to tell Player 2 how much money you wanted
returned to you.
(2)

_______You had a 50% chance of receiving your entire investment back if Player
2 did not give back at least the stated amount of return.

(3)

_______Neither of the above statements applied to your experiment.
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to have

Your ID #_________________________
Post-Experiment Questionnaire – No Investment – Player 2
Please take a few moments to answer the following questions. Your thoughtful responses will be
greatly appreciated and will help us to most accurately interpret the data we collected in today’s
experiment.
I.

Given you did not receive the money from Player 1, please answer the following
questions:
a. What do you think would have been the fair amount to give back had Player 1 given you his
or her $4?_______________________
b. If you were Player 1, would you give your $4 to Player 2?
Yes______
No_______

II.

Please answer the following questions by placing an “X” in the appropriate blank:

Gender:

Male__________

Do you have a job?

Female__________

Yes________

No________

If you DO have a job Part-Time_________ Full-Time________
Do you have another source of income? _____Yes

_____No

Level of Income:

Greater than $50,000______

Age:

Less than $50,000______

18 – 25______

Major in college:

26 – 33______

34 – 41______

42 or Older______

Business__________ Non-Business__________

III.
Which of the following statements best describes the rules under which the game took
place in today’s experiment? (check all that apply)
(1)
_______You had an opportunity to learn how much money Player 1 wanted
return.

you to

(2)
_______You would have had a 50% chance of losing your entire investment if
had not given back at least the stated amount of return.

you

(3)

_______Neither of the above statements applied to your experiment.
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Your ID #_________________________
Post-Experiment Questionnaire – Investment – Player 2
Please take a few moments to answer the following questions. Your thoughtful responses will be
greatly appreciated and will help us to most accurately interpret the data we collected in today’s
experiment.
I.

Given that you received the money from Player 1, please answer the following
questions:
c. What do you think is the fair amount to be given back to the Player 1 who gave you his or her
$4?_______________________
d. If you were Player 1, would you give your $4 to Player 2?
Yes______
No_______

II.

Please answer the following questions by placing an “X” in the appropriate blank:

Gender:

Male__________

Do you have a job?

Female__________

Yes________

No________

If you DO have a job Part-Time_________ Full-Time________
Do you have another source of income? _____Yes

_____No

Level of Income:

Greater than $50,000______

Age:

Less than $50,000______

18 – 25______

Major in college:

26 – 33______

34 – 41______

42 or Older______

Business__________ Non-Business__________

III.
Which of the following statements best describes the rules under which the game took
place in today’s experiment? (check all that apply)
(1)
_______You had an opportunity to learn how much money Player 1 wanted
return.

you to

(2)
_______You would have had a 50% chance of losing your entire investment if
had not given back at least the stated amount of return.

you

(3)

_______Neither of the above statements applied to your experiment.
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